Constitutional End Games: Making Presidential Term Limits Stick by Dixon, Rosalind & Landau, David
Hastings Law Journal 
Volume 71 Issue 2 Article 4 
2-2020 
Constitutional End Games: Making Presidential Term Limits Stick 
Rosalind Dixon 
David Landau 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Rosalind Dixon and David Landau, Constitutional End Games: Making Presidential Term Limits Stick, 71 
HASTINGS L.J. 359 (2020). 
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol71/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu. 
 [359] 
Constitutional End Games: Making Presidential 
Term Limits Stick 
ROSALIND DIXON† & DAVID LANDAU† 
Presidential term limits are an important and common protection of constitutional democracy 
around the world. But they are often evaded because they raise particularly difficult compliance 
problems that we call “end game” problems. Because presidents have overwhelming incentives 
to remain in power, they may seek extraordinary means to evade term limits. Comparative 
experience shows that presidents rely on a wide range of devices, such as formal constitutional 
change, wholesale constitutional replacement, and manipulation of the judiciary to get around 
permanent bans on reelection. In this Article, we draw on this experience to show that, in many 
contexts, weaker bans on reelection for consecutive terms, rather than permanent bans on any 
reelection, are the best response to the end game problem. Would-be authoritarian presidents are 
more likely to comply with term limits that force a temporary exit from the presidency because 
they hold open the prospect of an eventual return to power. Furthermore, a ban on consecutive 
reelection will allow alternative political forces to strengthen and make substantial democratic 
erosion less likely. In this sense, the United States’ oft-cited presidential term limit, which allows 
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INTRODUCTION 
Presidential term limits are a common feature in democratic constitutions 
worldwide. By our own calculations, over 80% of presidential and semi-
presidential constitutions in force today have presidential term limits.1 
Presidential term limits are common in constitutional democracies because they 
are often seen as fundamental for the preservation of constitutional democracy. 
Where presidents are able to remain in office indefinitely, comparative 
experience shows that they can consolidate enormous amounts of power that 
vitiate checks and balances by institutions such as legislatures and courts.2 While 
elections may continue to be held, they often become increasingly non-
competitive, as presidents amass formal and informal resources and use 
institutions like the judiciary to undermine the opposition. In the United States, 
although formal presidential term limits date only from the Twenty-Second 
Amendment, which was passed in 1947, many modern commentators now see 
the limits as a core protection of the democratic order.3 As we will show, despite 
its continued reputation as an international gold standard, the U.S. presidential 
term limit is vulnerable to term limit evasion in key respects. 
Presidents have very strong incentives to circumvent constitutional term 
limits in order to remain in power. A study by Mila Versteeg and her co-authors 
has recently shown that presidents, since 2000, have sought to evade term limits 
in roughly 25% of cases.4 Where presidents try to evade their term limit, they 
succeed about two-thirds of the time.5  
Presidents evade term limits through a variety of routes. Most commonly, 
many presidents seek a formal amendment to the term limit; in other cases, they 
induce courts to reinterpret the term limits or even to excise them entirely from 
 
 1. See infra Table 1. Other studies have reached similar results. For example, Ginsburg, Melton, and 
Elkins found that, between 1789 and 2006, about 60% of presidential and semi-presidential constitutions have 
had presidential term limits; this rises to over 75% for constitutions in force in 2006. See Tom Ginsburg et al., 
On the Evasion of Executive Term Limits, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1807, 1835–36, 1839 fig.1 (2011). In a study 
of 92 presidential and semi-presidential systems between 1992 and 2006, Gideon Maltz found that 87 had some 
form of presidential term limit. The relevant 92 countries included almost all key presidential democracies—
those with a population of more than two million people which had minimal norms of political openness. The 
99 “regimes” in those 92 countries included 47 democracies and 52 competitive or electoral authoritarian 
regimes. Gideon Maltz, The Case for Presidential Term Limits, 18 J. DEMOCRACY 128, 128–29 (2007).  
 2. See generally David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 189 (2013) (pointing 
out that there is a degree of abuse of power if the president may remain in office indefinitely); Maltz, supra note 
1 (explaining the adoption of presidential term limits after presidential power and the ongoing presidential power 
abuse in countries that have yet to adopt a term limit).  
 3.  See, e.g., Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsberg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV. 78, 
143–44 (2018) (arguing that the Twenty-Second Amendment and Article V cut off one key route towards 
authoritarianism in the United States).  
 4. See Mila Versteeg et al., The Law and Politics of Presidential Term Limits Evasion, 120 COLUM. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2020) (documenting cases and techniques of evasion since 2000).  
 5. See id.  
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the constitutional order.6 Because of the frequency of evasion attempts, 
presidential term limits raise special challenges to democratic constitutionalism.  
More than any other feature of a democratic constitution, presidential term 
limits create limited incentives for compliance. One of the important insights in 
constitutional scholarship in recent years is the degree to which many 
constitutional norms effectively become self-enforcing, or self-stabilizing, over 
time because they often serve as a basis for valuable forms of coordination 
between different political parties or government officials.7 Life-long bans on 
reelection limits, however, remove almost all incentives for presidents to engage 
in co-operation of this kind.  
Faced with such limits, incumbent presidents face a form of “end period” 
or “end game” problem. Compliance with term limits means that, in the short-
run, incumbent presidents are certain to lose the power and privileges associated 
with high electoral office, and, in the long-run, gain only limited or uncertain 
reputational benefits.8 In many fragile democracies, political parties will also be 
insufficiently strong and independent to exert pressure on a president to leave 
office. Instead, they may actively encourage the president to extend their term 
in office.  
What is the response to this problem? One possibility, as some recent work 
has suggested, is to give up the game entirely, and to remove term limits from 
constitutions in contexts where they are likely to prove ineffective as constraints 
on presidents.9 But this solution throws the baby out with the bath water. It gives 
up on a tool that is important for the preservation of democratic governance 
simply because compliance is problematic. 
Another response, which we have discussed extensively in recent work, is 
to entrench term limits by requiring especially demanding procedures to change 
them.10 In the extreme, term limits are sometimes made completely 
unamendable; less dramatically, constitutions can require special procedures 
like heightened supermajorities or referenda before term limits can be altered. 
These design solutions are sometimes helpful, but do not make the compliance 
problem go away. Indeed, in some circumstances, these demanding or special 
procedures to amend the term limits may worsen the end game problem because 
these procedures heighten the pressure on presidential leaders to seek other 
routes to eliminate term limits. 
 
 6. See id.  
 7. See, e.g., Tonja Jacobi et al., Judicial Review as a Self-Stabilizing Constitutional Mechanism, in 
COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW 185 (Erin F. Delaney & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2018); Daryl J. Levinson, 
Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657 (2011).  
 8. See Bruce Baker, Outstaying One’s Welcome: The Presidential Third-Term Debate in Africa, 8 
CONTEMP. POL. 285, 287 (2002). 
 9. See Ginsburg et al., supra note 1, at 1855–66.  
 10.  See Rosalind Dixon & David Landau, Tiered Constitutional Design, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 438 
(2018).  
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The optimal solution, we assert here, is to focus on temporary or 
consecutive, rather than permanent, bans on reelection. Consecutive bans, which 
prohibit consecutive reelection after one or more terms, require leaders to leave 
power periodically, but allow a return after one or more terms out of power. In 
other words, consecutive bans are “soft,” “flexible,” or “weak” term limits that 
limit the scope of consecutive presidential reelection but allow non-consecutive 
reelection.11  
Consecutive bans, as compared to permanent bans, have a key advantage. 
By giving presidents greater incentive to comply with democratic constitutional 
requirements, consecutive bans ameliorate the end game problem. Presidents 
who know they may be able to return to power later are more likely to leave 
power in the first place.  
At the same time, pushing powerful incumbents out of power, even 
temporarily, will be crucial in preventing the erosion of democracy. When 
presidents re-contest an election, they no longer enjoy the benefits of 
incumbency, and social and political conditions will often have changed. Voters 
may no longer see the president as necessary or indispensable to their well-
being. Other members of a president’s party may also have gained strength and 
an independent reputation, such that the party itself has a greater incentive and 
ability to support a broader range of candidates. 
Following this introduction, this Article is divided into seven parts. Part I 
outlines the existing scholarly literature on the relationship between term limits 
and democracy. Part II explains the prevalence and design of different kinds of 
term limits. Part III outlines the special problems of compliance posed by 
presidential term limits, and the empirical evidence of term limit evasion drawn 
from around the world over recent decades, particularly in Latin America and 
Africa. Part IV explores the causes and consequences of evasions of term limits.  
Parts V, VI, and VII deal with solutions. Part V explains and defends our 
proposal for weaker, consecutive bans on reelection as a solution to the end game 
problem. The proposal is rooted in the successful use of non-consecutive term 
limits in several countries.  
Part VI deals with an important caveat to our proposal: the problem of 
shadow presidents, or, in other words, circumstances where non-consecutive 
bans induce presidents to leave power formally but maintain power informally. 
For example, consider Russia, where Vladimir Putin temporarily left the 
presidency between 2008 and 2012 but continued to exercise considerable power 
 
 11.  Branko Milanovic et al., Political Alternation as a Restraint on Investing in Influence: Evidence from 
the Post-Communist Transition (World Bank Dev. Research Grp., Working Paper No. 4747, 2008). This is in 
line with the work of political researchers, such as Cain and Lopez, who suggest that the effectiveness of term 
limits is deeply dependent on questions of design and institutional setting. See Bruce E. Cain, The Varying 
Impact of Legislative Term Limits, in LEGISLATIVE TERM LIMITS: PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVES 21, 22 (Bernard 
Grofman ed., 1996); Edward J. López, Term Limits: Causes and Consequences, 114 PUB. CHOICE 1, 29 (2003).  
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as both prime minister and party leader throughout his “absence.”12 To be 
effective, non-consecutive term limits require the creation of incentives for 
presidents to move onto other non-partisan roles and the development of limits 
that prevent proxy rule by a president’s family members or close associates.  
Part VII briefly discusses three other proposals raised by recent 
constitutional design scholarship: the proposal to scrap term limits completely 
and rely instead on substitutes; the proposal to focus on popular enforcement as 
a way to protect term limits; and the proposal to allow changes to term limits 
only on a prospective-only basis such that it does not benefit the incumbent. 
While some of these proposals are complementary to our own and have 
considerable promise, they all raise problems from the standpoint of 
constitutional design. 
Finally, this Article concludes by considering the U.S. term limit provision 
in light of the arguments developed in this Article. The United States’ 
presidential two-term limit is highly entrenched because Article V makes the 
entire U.S. Constitution extremely difficult to change, and generally gives the 
minority party the ability to block that change.13 However, comparative 
experience shows that this very rigidity may increase the incentives of presidents 
to find other routes, such as manipulation of the judiciary, to achieve their goals. 
Thus, the United States’ presidential term limit is more vulnerable to democratic 
erosion than is commonly assumed. 
The U.S. Constitution does not deal with the end game problem as 
effectively as a weaker, or non-consecutive term limit. This may become a 
matter of immediate concern in the United States, given that a myriad of 
commentators have noted how the country currently appears to be particularly 
vulnerable to democratic erosion.14 It also suggests that the United States’ two-
term presidential term limit may be a poor model for presidential systems 
abroad, despite its popularity (it is one of the most commonly used presidential 
term limit found in the world today)15 and the United States’ continued 
reputation for democratic stability.16  
 
 12. See J. L. BLACK, THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENCY OF DMITRY MEDVEDEV, 2008–12: THE NEXT STEP 
FORWARD OR MERELY A TIME OUT? 12 (2015); Christian Need & Matthias Schepp, The Puppet President: 
Medvedev’s Betrayal of Russian Democracy, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Oct. 4, 2011, 3:51 PM), 
https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-puppet-president-medvedev-s-betrayal-of-russian-democracy-
a-789767.html. 
 13. See Huq & Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 143–44.  
 14. See id. at 165 (arguing that “there is a present danger of constitutional retrogression” in the United 
States). See generally CAN IT HAPPEN HERE? AUTHORITARIANISM IN AMERICA (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2018) 
(containing a series of essays on the United States’ vulnerabilities to authoritarianism); STEVEN LEVITSKY & 
DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE (2018) (pointing out various ways in which the United States may be 
vulnerable to global pathways of democratic erosion). 
 15. See Ginsburg et al., supra note 1, at 1836. 
 16. See infra Table 1. 
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I.  WHY TERM LIMITS? TERM LIMITS AND DEMOCRACY  
Presidential term limits have a wide range of defenders and critics. 
Defenders of term limits often point to several arguments in favor of such 
limits.17  
A. DEMOCRACY AND THE ADVANTAGES OF TERM LIMITS  
One argument in favor of term limits is that their existence may help draw 
more people into office. This argument has more force in some contexts than 
others (for example, in local and state elections, where there is a greater chance 
of participation by ordinary citizens, than say in national elections) and intersects 
with arguments for increasing the representation of women and racial minorities 
in political elections.18 Generally, the argument reflects deeper philosophical 
commitments to participatory forms of government and decision-making by all 
citizens. As such, the argument is sometimes labelled populist in nature.19 In the 
current climate of illiberal populism, it is perhaps better understood as an 
argument for more citizen participation in democratic self-government.  
A second argument focuses on the behavior of existing representatives and 
their tendency to vote in their own narrow self-interest, or that of their 
constituents, as opposed to the broader public interest.20 Term limits can help 
reduce pressure on legislators to vote with reelection in mind because it “frees” 
them of “career considerations” or eliminates the need to win reelection. Thus, 
legislators are given the scope to engage in reasoned deliberation and decision-
making, or “republican” forms of debate and representation.21 Some political 
scientists further suggest that term limits will reduce overall government 
expenditures, especially inefficient forms of expenditure designed to ensure the 
reelection of specific representatives.22 
 
 17. See Bruce E. Cain & Marc A. Levin, Term Limits, 2 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 163, 167–72 (1999). 
 18. See, e.g., Mark P. Petracca, A Legislature in Transition: The California Experience with Term Limits 
19 (Inst. Governmental Studies, Working Paper No. 96-19, 1996).  
 19. See Cain & Levin, supra note 17, at 168–69; Robert Kurfirst, Term-limit Logic: Paradigms and 
Paradoxes, 29 POLITY 119, 123–24 (1996). 
 20. This, of course, reflects more general tensions within democratic theory about the nature of democracy 
and the broader role of legislators. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 
(2003); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999).  
 21. See HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR., AMERICA’S CONSTITUTIONAL SOUL (1991); GEORGE F. WILL, 
RESTORATION: CONGRESS, TERM LIMITS, AND THE RECOVERY OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (1992); Cain & 
Levin, supra note 17, at 170; Ginsburg et al., supra note 1, at 1822; Kurfirst, supra note 19, at 125–26. For 
empirical support for this idea, see, for example, Holger Sieg & Chamna Yoon, Estimating Dynamic Games of 
Electoral Competition to Evaluate Term Limits in U.S. Gubernational Elections, 107 AM. ECON. REV. 1824 
(2017); Daniel J. Smith et al., Long Live the King? Death as a Term Limit on Executives 8–9 (Feb. 22, 2018) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
 22. See Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? 
Evidence from Gubernational Term Limits, 110 Q.J. ECONOMICS 769 (1995); Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 
Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 25 (1995); 
Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States, 41 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 7 (2003). But see López, supra note 11. 
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The most important modern argument in favor of presidential term limits–
and the one emphasized in this Article—is that term limits have the capacity to 
protect democracy and democratic competition by reducing the advantages that 
an incumbent possesses in democratic elections and the strength of an 
incumbent’s individual personal rule.23  
Incumbents enjoy a range of advantages in democratic elections. For 
example, they generally enjoy a stronger reputation or name-recognition among 
voters, compared to their competitors. John Lott describes these advantages as 
the product of a prior “investment in brand name capital” that is both “sunk” and 
“non-transferable,” and that can create an effective barrier to entry by political 
challengers.24 Voters may also be inherently biased toward incumbents because 
they may perceive less risk associated with incumbents than with challengers.25  
In addition, incumbents may have greater access to state resources, the 
support of the media and interest groups, and the ability to rely on forms of 
clientelist or patronage politics to ensure reelection.26 In hybrid or electoral 
authoritarian regimes, incumbents may benefit from the active support of state 
media outlets and the ability to use both the civil and criminal law to intimidate 
and harass the political opposition and its supporters. The advantages 
incumbents enjoy are not the same across all political systems. As Nic 
Cheeseman notes, U.S. incumbents often benefit from strong name recognition, 
whereas African incumbents rely more heavily on patronage networks.27 
However, there is strong empirical evidence that incumbent legislators and 
executive actors enjoy advantages as a result of their incumbency worldwide. 
In the United States, the incumbent reelection rate was approximately 97% 
in the House of Representatives and 93% in the Senate in 2016.28 At the state 
 
 23. Some political scientists further suggest that this gives incumbents opportunities for “rent extraction.” 
Term limits can also potentially limit this kind of rent extraction both directly and indirectly—by reducing 
incumbent reelection, and by limiting the timeframe over which incumbents can reach agreements to engage in 
log-rolling or rent-sharing behavior. See Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization 
of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132, 138 (1988). 
 24.  John R. Lott, Jr., The Effect of Nontransferable Property Rights on the Efficiency of Political Markets: 
Some Evidence, 32 J. PUB. ECON. 231 (1987); see also John R. Lott, Jr., Brand Names and Barriers to Entry in 
Political Markets, 51 PUB. CHOICE 87, 89–90 (1986). 
 25. See M. Daniel Bernhardt & Daniel E. Ingberman, Candidate Reputations and the “Incumbency Effect,” 
27 J. PUB. ECON. 47, 49 (1985). The counter-argument is of course that in some elections, voters are looking for 
change and will thus, tend to be biased toward challengers.  
 26. See Nic Cheeseman, African Elections as Vehicles for Change, 21 J. DEMOCRACY 139, 145–46 (2010); 
John N. Friedman & Richard T. Holden, The Rising Incumbent Reelection Rate: What’s Gerrymandering Got 
to Do with It?, 71 J. POLITICS 593, 596 (2009); Ginsburg et al., supra note 1, at 1820; Maltz, supra note 1, at 
131–35. 
 27. See Cheeseman, supra note 26, at 140, 145–46.  
 28. Kyle Kondik & Geoffrey Skelley, Incumbent Reelection Rates Higher than Average in 2016, 
RASMUSSEN REP. (Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/ 
political_commentary/commentary_by_kyle_kondik/incumbent_reelection_rates_higher_than_average_in_20
16; see also Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Estimating Incumbency Advantage Without Bias, 34 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 1142 (1990).  
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level, sitting governors enjoyed an 80% reelection rate.29 For presidents, the 
reelection rate was lower: of twenty-six presidents who ran for reelection in a 
general election, only sixteen, or 62%, won a second consecutive term.30 But 
this pattern is not replicated in other presidential systems, where incumbents 
seem to have larger advantages. 
In Latin America, Javier Corrales and Michael Penfold found that, between 
1998 and 2006, sitting presidents enjoyed a 90% chance of winning a second 
consecutive term, and an 83% chance of subsequent or indefinite reelection, 
such that there was effectively a 62.8% increased chance of reelection for 
presidential incumbents.31 Incumbency also affected the margin of victory in 
presidential elections; it increased the margin of a president’s victory over their 
nearest rival by approximately 11.2%,32 and was the strongest factor in 
predicting both the probability and margin of victory for presidential elections.33  
In Africa, Gideon Maltz likewise found that, in elections between 1992 and 
2006, incumbent presidents were re-elected at a rate of 93%.34 The incumbent 
reelection rate is so high in Africa that, when combined with patterns of ongoing 
authoritarian rule, only twelve sub-Saharan countries between 1989 and 2010 
experienced a change in presidential leadership through democratic elections.35 
Since then, there have been only three notable instances of a change in 
presidential leadership as a result of democratic elections in which incumbents 
were eligible to run: Nigeria and Zambia in 2015,36 and Ghana in 2016.37 As 
Cheeseman notes, this is not simply due to the significant number of electoral or 
competitive authoritarian systems in Africa.38 Even when these countries are 
excluded, incumbents won reelection in 64% of elections.39 
 
 29. Kondik & Skelley, supra note 28.  
 30. See Michael Medved, For U.S. Presidents, Odds for a Second Term Are Surprisingly Long, DAILY 
BEAST, https://www.thedailybeast.com/for-us-presidents-odds-for-a-second-term-are-surprisingly-long (last 
updated July 13, 2017, 1:20 PM) (reporting 15). President Obama is the 16th. See Michael E. Purdy, Only 30% 
of U.S. Presidents Served 2 Full Terms, PRESIDENTIAL HISTORY (Jan. 16, 2013), 
https://presidentialhistory.com/2013/01/only-30-of-u-s-presidents-served-2-full-terms.html. Of the other 17 
previous presidents, 5 died while in office, 7 declined to run for reelection, and 5 failed to gain their party’s 
nomination. PRESIDENTS, https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/presidents/ (last visited Jan. 24, 
2020). 
 31. Javier Corrales & Michael Penfold, Manipulating Term Limits in Latin America, 25 J. DEMOCRACY 
157, 163 (2014).  
 32. Id. at 164.  
 33. See id. at 162–64.  
 34. Cheeseman, supra note 26, at 139–40; Maltz, supra note 1, at 134. 
 35. Cheeseman, supra note 26, at 139.  
 36. See Africa’s 2015 Election Experiences Present Dilemmas for 2016 Polls, CONVERSATION (Jan. 26, 
2016, 11:02 PM), https://theconversation.com/africas-2015-election-experiences-present-dilemmas-for-2016-
polls-53312. 
 37. Yomi Kazeem, Ghana Has Elected Nana Akufo-Addo as Its New President, QUARTZ AFR. (Dec. 9, 
2016), https://qz.com/858481/ghana-decides-nana-akufo-addo-has-been-elected-as-ghanas-new-president/. 
 38. See Cheeseman, supra note 26, at 142.  
 39. Id. 
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Term limits can significantly reduce the advantage of incumbency in 
democratic elections. In the United States, there is strong evidence that term 
limits tend to increase the competitiveness of legislative elections. Kermit 
Daniel and John Lott, for example, found that term limits had a strong and 
significant effect on a range of measures of competitiveness in state legislative 
elections, including who won, who was defeated, the margin between the top 
two candidates, and the number of unopposed races.40 
In a global context, there is likewise evidence that term limits promote an 
increase in political competition, as well as alternation in individual rule. A 
transition in political leadership often weakens the dominant political party in a 
competitive authoritarian regime such that it is less able to engage in tactics 
designed to undermine true political competition, such as electoral intimidation, 
voter registration fraud, and vote tampering.41 A new leader of a party also 
generally has less electoral name recognition and respect than the outgoing 
president.42 New party leaders may even be selected in part because they are not 
seen to pose a serious threat to the ongoing power and prestige of the outgoing 
president. This gives opposition parties a significantly greater chance of success 
in elections against successor candidates than against incumbents. 
Two leading examples, highlighted by Maltz, are the changes in political 
control of the presidency in Croatia, in 2000, and Kenya, in 2002.43 In Croatia, 
President Franjo Tudjman and his Croatian Democratic Union had been in 
power since 1990, but when Tudjman died, his political successor failed to reach 
the runoff stage at subsequent presidential elections.44 In Kenya, President 
Daniel Arp Moi ruled from 1978 to 2002.45 When Moi left office in 2002, at the 
end of the formal term limits he agreed to in the 1990s, his party lost control of 
the presidency, and Mwa Kibaki was elected to office.46 Moi’s successor, Uhuru 
Kenyatta, did not enjoy the same popular support or appeal as Moi, and many 
commentators believe that Moi in fact chose Kenyatta because of this weakness, 
understanding that it would make him dependent upon Moi.47 
These patterns are also borne out by quantitative studies of presidential 
reelection rates. In Africa, for example, Maltz found that successor candidates 
(candidates from the same party as an outgoing president) have a 52% chance of 
 
 40. See Kermit Daniel & John R. Lott, Jr., Term Limits and Electoral Competitiveness: Evidence from 
California’s State Legislative Races, 90 PUB. CHOICE 165, 181 tbl.7 (1997).  
 41. Maltz, supra note 1, at 133–34. 
 42. See Joel Lieske, The Political Dynamics of Urban Voting Behavior, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 150, 168 
(1989).  
 43. Maltz, supra note 1, at 131–32.  
 44. Id. at 131.  
 45. Id. 
 46. See id. 
 47. See id. at 132.  
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a successful election, compared to a 93% reelection rate for incumbents.48 In 
competitive democracies, the figure is 50%, compared to 64% for incumbents.49 
The mere alternation in individual presidential rule can help protect 
democracy, even where the alternation occurs within an existing party. 
Libertarian arguments for term limits, for example, focus on the capacity of term 
limits to weaken the power of the legislative or executive branch, and thus, 
promote commitments to limited government and individual liberty.50 These 
arguments overlap with democratic arguments for term limits, or at least 
executive term limits.  
A common hallmark of authoritarian government is an extremely strong 
executive branch that has a tradition of personalist presidential rule. Guarding 
against the danger of authoritarianism, therefore, will generally require limiting 
the powers of the executive branch, especially if there are individual executive 
leaders.51 Term limits are an obvious way to do this because they force a 
dominant president to leave office in ways that reduce the informal power of the 
presidency. Term limits also undermine the network of clientelist and patronage 
relationships that help sustain electoral authoritarian systems.52 The spread of 
presidential term limits in both Africa and Latin America in recent decades 
reflects this logic.53 As John Carey notes, these prohibitions have been 
“motivated both by theory and by experiences of individual politicians who 
endeavored to entrench themselves in power.”54 
B. OBJECTIONS AND DISADVANTAGES  
Critics of term limits, on the other hand, suggest that they tend to 
undermine democracy because they deprive institutions of the professional 
expertise and experience needed for success, undermine the incentives and 
accountability of elected officials, and deny voters the opportunity to re-elect 
their preferred representative.55 These arguments also have a long lineage—
 
 48. Id. at 134. 
 49. Cheeseman, supra note 26, at 142.  
 50. See Cain & Levin, supra note 17, at 171; Kurfirst, supra note 19, at 126–27. 
 51. See Baker, supra note 8, at 288–89; Maltz, supra note 1, at 130. 
 52. See Baker, supra note 8, at 288–89, 297–98; Cheeseman, supra note 26, at 150–51; Maltz, supra note 
1, at 136–37; Milanovic et al., supra note 11.  
 53. See John M. Carey, The Reelection Debate in Latin America, 45 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y 119, 122, 
127 (2003); see also Ginsburg et al., supra note 1; Maltz, supra note 1, at 131; Denis M. Tull & Claudia Simons, 
The Institutionalization of Power Revisited: Presidential Term Limits in Africa, 52 AFR. SPECTRUM 79, 82 
(2017). 
 54. Carey, supra note 53, at 122. Simon Bolivar made an earlier argument for term limits in Latin America 
on this basis. See Ginsburg et al., supra note 1, at 1819–20. Note, however, that Bolivar ultimately reversed his 
position. See Carey, supra note 53, at 121–22; Ginsburg et al., supra note 1, at 1819. 
 55. See Cain & Levin, supra note 17, at 182–84; Ginsburg et al., supra note 1, at 1824; Mark P. Petracca, 
Why Political Scientists Oppose Term Limits (Feb. 18, 1992) (unpublished briefing paper) (on file with the Cato 
Institute) (addressing professionalism).  
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many of them were made by Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 72.56 Some 
scholarship credit Hamilton’s arguments for defeating proposals to include 
presidential term limits in the original U.S. Constitution.57 
Concerns about expertise and electoral incentives, discussed in Part V, can 
be addressed by appropriately generous and flexible forms of term limits. The 
concern about democracy seems to overlook two key arguments. First, term 
limits can play a role in preventing a slide toward authoritarianism or democratic 
regression. Second, there are democratic procedural arguments in favor of such 
limits (for example, the strong degree of popular support for the enactment of 
term limits, and the fact that many term limit provisions are introduced by way 
of an amendment proposed or ratified by voters at referenda).  
In Africa, for example, public opinion polling by Afrobarometer between 
2011 and 2013 found that 75% of voters across thirty-four countries favored a 
two-term limit for presidents.58 Ed Glaeser suggests that this is consistent with 
risk aversion among democratic voters due to a preference for “cycling of 
ideologies rather than locking into a single ideology,” or a preference for a 
degree of ongoing political or ideological alternation.59 
Some scholars further suggest that, at least under certain conditions, term 
limits may help promote democratic choice. Term limits solve a coordination 
problem among voters in different parties who wish to see, in addition to a norm 
of alternation in office, candidates from their own party succeed in elections.60  
We do not suggest that democratic concerns necessarily favor term limits 
in all contexts and for all institutions. The strength of the executive in fragile 
democracies, for example, is itself often the product of a history of weak 
legislatures incapable of imposing any meaningful checks on the executive 
branch. A key means of checking the potential for abuse by the legislature will 
thus be to increase the power and independence of the legislature. A stronger 
legislature will often impose term limits on the executive.61 Term limits, as 
Robert Kurfirst notes, have an important impact not only on the absolute power 
of institutions, but also on their relative power and standing.62 
 
 56. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 72 (Alexander Hamilton) (Yale Univ. Press ed., 2009).  
 57. See Carey, supra note 53, at 120–21. 
 58. See BONIFACE DULANI, AFRICAN PUBLICS STRONGLY SUPPORT TERM LIMITS, RESIST LEADERS’ 
EFFORTS TO EXTEND THEIR TENURE 3 fig.1 (2015); see also Adrienne LeBas, Term Limits and Beyond: Africa’s 
Democratic Hurdles, 115 CURRENT HIST. 169, 170 (2016) (explaining that Africa is paying heightened attention 
to the idea of presidential term limits).  
 59. See Edward L. Glaeser, Self-Imposed Term Limits, 93 PUB. CHOICE 389, 390 (1997). 
 60.  See, e.g., Andrew R. Dick & John R. Lott, Jr., Reconciling Voters’ Behavior with Legislative Term 
Limits, 50 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 8 (1993); Einer Elhauge, Are Term Limits Undemocratic?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 83, 
85–86 (1997); Glaeser, supra note 59, at 389–90.  
 61. Some economists likewise suggest that it is important to weaken personal rule so as to promote the rule 
of law—this encourages private actors to invest in general rule of law protections, rather than in developing 
“clientilistic” relationships with individual political leaders. See Milanovic et al., supra note 11, at 3–4.  
 62. See Kurfirst, supra note 19, at 129–34. For the argument that term limits on executive and legislative 
officials may in fact be symbiotic or complementary in this context, see Michael J. Malbin & Gerald Benjamin, 
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Thus, we focus here on presidential term limits. Some countries may 
choose to adopt legislative term limits as an additional tool for promoting good 
government. However, the case for legislative term limits is more contingent, 
especially in cases where they weaken the power of the legislature and, thus, 
create an imbalance in the separation of powers.63  
II.  MODELS OF PRESIDENTIAL TERM LIMITS 
In constitutional design, arguments in favor of presidential term limits have 
won the day in the modern period. However, historically, this tradeoff was not 
always resolved in favor of presidential term limits, and term limits have not 
always been a standard part of constitutional design. Many early national 
constitutions, such as the United States Constitution of 1787 and the French 
Constitution of 1791, did not include them.64 The U.S. Constitution instead 
adopted an informal two-term limit, which lasted until President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt ran for, and won, four consecutive terms in the 1930s and 
1940s.65 Following his death, the United States formalized a presidential two-
term limit in the 22nd Amendment, which was adopted in 1951.66 
In recent times, the adoption of presidential term limits has become the 
overwhelming design choice in presidential and semi-presidential systems.67 
Public opinion data shows that presidential term limits are generally very 
popular.68 Even where individual presidents are popular, voters do not want 
them to remain in office forever. In contrast, term limits for other kinds of actors 
are less common. For example, a much smaller number of countries have term 
limits for members of the legislature.69 Similarly, term limits for subnational 
officials, such as governors, appear to be less common than for presidents.70  
Table 1, based on our own calculations, presents term limits in all presidential 
and semi-presidential systems as of 2019. The most immediate point is that most 
systems have presidential term limits—only 16% lack them. Moreover, the 
characteristics of these countries support an argument that the absence of 
presidential term limits tends to erode constitutional democracy. Most of these 
countries, such as Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Cameroon, Nicaragua, and 
 
Legislatures After Term Limits, in LIMITING LEGISLATIVE TERMS 209, 220 (Gerald Benjamin & Michael J. 
Malbin eds., 1992).  
 63. In this sense, we take the opposite approach to much of the literature, which tends to be more heavily 
focused on legislative as opposed to executive term limits. See López, supra note 11, at 2. 
 64. As noted above, Hamilton, in the Federalist Papers, argued against them. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 72, 
supra note 56.  
 65. See Peter Feuerherd, How FDR’s Presidency Inspired Term Limits, DAILY JSTOR (Apr. 12, 2018), 
https://daily.jstor.org/how-fdrs-presidency-inspired-term-limits/. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See ALEXANDER BATURO, DEMOCRACY, DICTATORSHIP, AND TERM LIMITS 32 (2014). 
 68. See Dulani, supra note 58.  
 69. See VENICE COMMISSION, REPORT ON TERM LIMITS (2019) [hereinafter REPORT ON TERM LIMITS] 
(exemplifying the ongoing debate about whether the legislature should be subject to term limits). 
 70. See id.  
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Venezuela, are ones that observers have argued are hybrid or pure authoritarian 
regimes.71 
 
Table 1: Presidential Term Limits in Presidential and Semi-Presidential 
Systems, 2019 
 
Type of Term Limit Percent of Countries 
No reelection allowed 8% 
Bar on consecutive term after one term 8% 
Bar on consecutive term after two terms 7% 
Absolute bar after two terms 57% 
Ambiguous whether absolute or consecutive bar 
after two terms 
4% 
No term limit 16% 
     
     *NOTE: SOURCE: AUTHORS’ CALCULATIONS FROM CONSTITUTIONAL TEXTS. 
Initially, constitutions that now lack term limits often included them.72 But 
in order to remain in power, incumbents used constitutional amendments, 
through the use of referenda, or other devices such as judicial decisions, to 
remove the term limits.73 The argument in favor of the removal of term limits 
generally stressed the importance of continuity in exceptional circumstances.74 
For example, in Venezuela, a 1999 Constituent Assembly dominated by 
President Chavez stretched the presidential term limit from one term to two 
terms.75 Later, during Chavez’s second full term, he called for two referenda, 
one in 2007 and another in 2009, to remove presidential term limits.76 The first 
effort narrowly failed, but the second succeeded.77 The argument from Chavez 
and his allies was essentially that reelection was a regrettable necessity to keep 
 
 71. See Nicolas Cherry, The Abolition of Presidential Term Limits in Nicaragua: The Rise of Nicaragua’s 
Next Dictator?, 2 CORNELL INT’L L.J. ONLINE 31 (2014) (discussing Nicaragua); Maltz, supra note 1, at 130, 
128, 135 (discussing Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Venezuela); Cheryl Hendricks & Gabriel Ngah 
Kiven, Cameroon Presidential Poll Underscores the Need for Term Limits, CONVERSATION (Oct. 8, 2018, 11:19 
AM), https://theconversation.com/cameroon-presidential-poll-underscores-the-need-for-term-limits-104583 
(discussing Cameroon). 
 72. See Ginsburg et al., supra note 1, 1835–36; Cheryl Hendricks & Gabriel Ngah Kiven, Presidential 
Term Limits: Slippery Slope Back to Authoritarianism in Africa, CONVERSATION (May 17, 2018, 8:44 AM), 
https://theconversation.com/presidential-term-limits-slippery-slope-back-to-authoritarianism-in-africa-96796; 
Boniface Madalitso Dulani, Personal Rule and Presidential Term Limits in Africa (2011) (unpublished Ph.D 
dissertation, Michigan State University) (on file with Michigan State University Library).   
 73. See, e.g., REPORT ON TERM LIMITS, supra note 69, at 14 (prohibiting use of referenda to override a 
constitutional amendment to instate term limits, if adopted); Ginsburg et al., supra note 1, at 1810, 1812, 1847–
48. 
 74. See, e.g., Ginsburg et al., supra note 1, 1823–27.  
 75. See Venezuela’s Chavez Era 1958–2013, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS., 
https://www.cfr.org/timeline/venezuelas-chavez-era (last visited Jan. 24, 2020). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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his project on track, and the sweeping transformations that his regime was 
carrying out could not be entrusted to anyone else.78  
Some countries, about 8% of presidential and semi-presidential systems, 
take the strictest possible stance towards presidential term limits and prohibit 
any presidential reelection once an incumbent has served a single term in 
office.79 The position taken by these countries obviously stresses the risks of 
reelection to democracy, even at the cost of foregoing the expertise and 
incentives that reelection may promote.  
Of course, the effect of a strict one-term limit will also depend on other 
formal and informal aspects of the constitution. The most obvious interaction 
here is the length of presidential terms. Globally, presidential terms appear to 
vary between four and seven years, and term lengths closer to the latter end of 
the spectrum will give presidents more space to pursue their agendas than the 
former.  
In Mexico, for example, presidents can serve only one six-year term in their 
lives.80 The principle of no reelection is a defining principle of Mexican politics, 
even during its lengthy one-party dictatorship throughout most of the 20th 
century.81 In some ways, a lengthy term counterbalances the lack of reelection. 
As a result, Mexico has had a series of highly consequential administrations 
during the dictatorship, and during and after its transition to democracy.82 
Colombia, in contrast, historically allowed only one four-year term in a 
president’s lifetime.83 In 2005, President Alvaro Uribe amended the constitution 
to allow two consecutive terms and won reelection to a second term.84 However, 
his subsequent attempt to amend the constitution again to allow three straight 
terms was blocked by the courts.85 As a result, both Uribe and his successor, 
Juan Manuel Santos, were highly consequential presidents who served two terms 
each.86 The former pursued a strategy of “democratic security” to repress the 
 
 78. See David Landau, Constitution-Making and Authoritarianism in Venezuela: The First Time as 
Tragedy, the Second as Farce, in CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? 161–63 (Mark A. Graber et al. eds., 
2018). 
 79. See supra Table 1. 
 80. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CP, Arts. 82–83, Diario Oficial de la 
Federacíon [DOF] 05-02-1917, últimas reformas DOF 09-08-2019 (Mex.).  
 81. See Jeffrey Weldon, The Political Sources of Presidencialismo in Mexico, in PRESIDENTIALISM AND 
DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA 225 (Scott Mainwaring & Matthew Soberg Shugart eds., 1997).  
 82. See EMILY EDMONDS-POLI & DAVID A. SHIRK, CONTEMPORARY MEXICAN POLITICS 49–96 (3d ed. 
2016). 
 83. See Rosalind Dixon & David Landau, Transnational Constitutionalism and a Limited Doctrine of 
Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 606, 615 (2015). 
 84. See id. at 615–16. 
 85. Id. at 616.  
 86. See, e.g., Alia M. Matanock & Miguel García-Sánchez, The Colombian Paradox: Peace Processes, 
Elite Divisions and Popular Plebiscites, DAEDALUS J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 152 (2017); Jeremy McDermott, 
How President Alvaro Uribe Changed Colombia, BBC NEWS (Aug. 4, 2010), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-10841425; Maria Alejandra Silva, Alvaro Uribe: The Most 
Dangerous Man in Colombian Politics, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFF. (Oct. 20, 2017), 
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FARC guerilla movement, and the latter sought a peace agreement that took 
many years to pursue.87 Santos, however, re-imposed a one-term, four-year limit 
during his second term in office, and it remains to be seen how this will impact 
the strength of future administrations.88  
Most presidential and semi-presidential systems around the world take an 
intermediate position, balancing the benefits and costs of presidential term 
limits. The most common design, implemented by over half of all presidential 
and semi-presidential systems, prohibits any reelection after two consecutive 
terms in office.89 This absolute bar on reelection after two terms appears to be 
aimed at balancing different aspects of the tradeoff. An absolute two-term limit 
allows voters to reward good performance and punish bad performance. 
Moreover, successful programs can continue for eight or more years, depending 
on the length of presidential term, giving presidents considerable time to develop 
their policies. Nonetheless, the term limit forces turnover in office and prevents 
incumbent presidents from amassing too much power. 
An alternative design choice, one we argue for in this Article, bars 
consecutive reelection.90 A system that bars consecutive reelection allows 
presidents to serve one or two terms in office consecutively, but then require that 
they sit out for one or more terms before running for election again.91 Chile, for 
example, bars consecutive reelection from presidents after serving one four-year 
term, but allows them to return to power after sitting out one term.92 Former 
president Michele Bachelet, for example, served between 2006 and 2010, and 
again from 2014 until 2018.93  
 
http://www.coha.org/alvaro-uribe-the-most-dangerous-man-in-colombian-politics/; Lally Weymouth, An 
Interview with Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/an-interview-with-colombian-presidentjuan-manuel-
santos/2014/08/07/3eaff428-1ced-11e4-82f9-2cd6fa8da5c4_story.html.  
 87. See Matanock & García-Sánchez, supra note 86, at 155; McDermott, supra note 86. 
 88. See Elizabeth Reyes L., Colombian Lawmakers Approve a One-Term Limit for Presidents, EL PAÍS 
(June 4, 2015, 3:59 PM), https://elpais.com/elpais/2015/06/04/inenglish/1433416990_898964.html. 
 89. See supra Table 1. 
 90. Ginsburg, Melton, and Elkins find that the most common design of all presidential term limits 
historically (as opposed to just those in force today) allowed consecutive reelection after one term in office—
27% of all constitutions used this model, according to their data. See Ginsburg et al., supra note 1, at 1836. 
 91. As noted in Table 1, there is a small group of countries where it is clear from the constitutional text 
that presidents can serve only two consecutive terms in office, but it is unclear whether they are only temporarily 
or permanently barred after serving two terms. Taiwan, for example, recently had some controversy about 
whether ex two-term President Ma Ying-Jeou could seek a third term after sitting out one term. See Brian Hioe, 
Claims by SCMP that Ma Can Run for a Third Presidential Term Are Ludicrous, NEW BLOOM (May 10, 2018), 
https://newbloommag.net/2018/05/10/scmp-ma-third-term/. In Malawi, the Supreme Court, in 2009, held that 
an ambiguous term limit should be interpreted to bar a potential nonconsecutive third term by former President 
Bakili Muluzi. See Muluzi Denied Slot in Malawi Election, UPI (May 16, 2009, 12:50 PM), 
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/2009/05/16/Muluzi-denied-slot-in-Malawi-election/88971242492659/?ur3=1.  
 92. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 25. 
 93. See Ernesto Londoño, President Bachelet of Chile Is the Last Woman Standing in the Americas, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/24/world/americas/michelle-bachelet-president-of-
chile.html. 
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Until this year, the island country of Comoros allowed presidents to serve 
unlimited, non-consecutive five-year terms.94 Current President Azali 
Assoumani previously served as president between 1999 and 2002, as well as 
between 2002 and 2006.95 Brazil requires that presidents sit out for at least one 
term after serving two consecutive terms in office.96 President Luiz Inacio Lula 
da Silva (Lula), for example, served as president for two terms between 2003 
and 2010, and was planning to run again for a second term in 2019, before being 
jailed on corruption charges.97  
The bar against consecutive reelection balances the tradeoff involved in 
presidential term limits in a somewhat different way than an absolute bar. 
Forcing presidents to leave power may help to break excessive consolidation of 
power—even if presidents are able to return later—but still gives presidents 
incentives towards electoral accountability, since they may seek a new term in 
the future. A bar against consecutive reelection also gives presidents more than 
one term to pursue their projects, especially when they are allowed to pursue 
two consecutive terms before leaving power.  
As we emphasize in Part V, a design that stresses consecutive, instead of 
absolute, bans on reelection may reduce the inclination of incumbents to evade 
term limits by lessening the costs of compliance, thus reducing what we call the 
“end game” problem.  
Notably, only one system with any presidential term limits appears to allow 
more than two consecutive terms in office. In the Republic of the Congo, a 2015 
referendum amended the constitution to allow three consecutive four-year terms 
in office.98 The apparent lack of countries that follow a similar system reflects a 
fairly broad consensus, at least at the level of constitutional design, that allowing 
more than two consecutive terms in office poses threats to constitutional 
democracy that outweigh any gains in electoral accountability and continuity in 
policy. Despite this consensus, a number of presidents have managed to use 
devices, such as temporary constitutional provisions or judicial interpretation, to 
circumvent their term limits and remain in power.99 
 
 94. CONSTITUTION DE L’UNION DES COMOROS [CONSTITUTION] Mar. 24, 2001, art. 13. The new system 
allows two consecutive terms. See Comoros Islanders Vote in Presidential Election, BBC NEWS (Mar. 24, 2019), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47685991?intlink_from_url=https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cx1m 
7zg0gnlt/comoros&link_location=live-reporting-story. 
 95. See Former Coup Leader Wins Presidential Race in Comoros, VOA NEWS (Apr. 15, 2016, 8:43 PM), 
https://www.voanews.com/africa/former-coup-leader-wins-presidential-race-comoros. 
 96. CONSTITUIҪÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] Dec. 2017, art. 14 (Braz.). 
 97. See Dom Phillips, Brazil’s Lula Launches Presidential Bid from Jail as Thousands March in Support, 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 15, 2018, 6:48 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/15/brazil-lula-
presidential-election-campaign-jail. 
 98. See Philon Bondenga, Congo Votes by Landslide to Allow Third Presidential Term, REUTERS (Oct. 27, 
2015, 12:13 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-politics/congo-votes-by-landslide-to-allow-third-
presidential-term-idUSKCN0SL0JW20151027. 
 99. A very small number of systems combine the logic of consecutive and absolute prohibitions on 
reelection. These systems generally require presidents to sit out after serving one term in office, but also limit 
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In summary, while the vast majority of presidential and semi-presidential 
systems have some kind of term limit to prevent the erosion of democracy, 
almost all systems allow presidents to serve more than one term. This reflects 
the value that constitutional designers place significant value on other goals, 
such as accountability, efficiency, and continuity in public policy.  
III.  THE PROBLEM OF COMPLIANCE 
There is a strong positive correlation worldwide between the increasing 
constitutional entrenchment of presidential term limits and the tendency of 
presidents to leave office “voluntarily” as part of a peaceful democratic 
transition, rather than through a military coup.  
In Africa especially, Daniel Posner and Daniel Young note that many 
countries introduced new, entrenched constitutional term limits from the 1990s 
onward: thirty-two out of thirty-eight constitutions between 1990 and 2005 
adopted or entrenched such limits.100 During this period, there was a marked 
increase in the number of leaders who left “voluntarily,” rather than through 
coups, assassination, or other involuntary means. Between 2000 and 2005, only 
19% of leaders left power involuntarily, whereas 70–75% did so in the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s.101 Of those seventeen leaders that left office “voluntarily” 
between 2000 and 2005, nine also departed when they reached the end of their 
presidential term limits.102 
The overall pattern globally, however, is not quite so positive. Rather, it 
involves a significant amount of non-compliance with presidential term 
limits.103 Tom Ginsburg, James Melton, and Zachary Elkins note that, of the 352 
cases in their dataset where presidents had the opportunity to over-stay (in other 
words, did not depart early from office), 89 involved an attempt by presidents to 
stay beyond their constitutionally permitted term, and 71 of those attempts were 
successful.104 Of these 71 cases, 56 involved formal constitutional amendment 
or replacement, 29 and 27 respectively, five involved the suspension of the 
constitution, and 10 involved the circumvention or disregard of constitutional 
 
the total number of terms they can serve in their lives. For example, Haiti limits presidents to serving one 
consecutive five-year term; they can return to power after sitting out one term, but are limited to serving only 
two terms in their lives. LA CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE D’HAITI [CONSTITUTION] 1987, art. 134–3 (“The 
President of the Republic may not be re-elected. He may serve an additional term only after an interval of five 
(5) years. He may in no case run for a third term.”).  
 100. See Daniel N. Posner & Daniel J. Young, The Institutionalization of Political Power in Africa, 18 J. 
DEMOCRACY 126, 132 fig. 3 (2007). 
 101. See id. at 128 fig.1, 128–29.  
 102. Id. at 129. 
 103. For skepticism about compliance, see Daron Acemoglu et al., A Political Theory of Populism, 18 Q.J. 
ECONOMICS 771, 792 (2013); Baker, supra note 8, at 285; Javier Corrales & Michael Penfold, Manipulating 
Term Limits in Latin America, 25 J. DEMOCRACY 157, 158 (2014); Ginsburg et al., supra note 1, 1847–50; Maltz, 
supra note 1, at 129–30; Smith et al., supra note 21, at 6–7. 
 104. Ginsburg et al., supra note 1, at 1848–49.  
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limitations.105 Moreover, 15 of these “constitutional overstaying” attempts 
occurred in countries that were constitutional democracies at the time.106 Some 
of these occurred in the 19th and early 20th centuries: Costa Rica in 1876,107 as 
well as in 1898;108 Colombia in 1886;109 Uruguay in 1935;110 and Honduras in 
1936.111 Others were more recent, including the Philippines in 1973, Peru in 
1995, Argentina in 1995, Brazil in 1998, Venezuela in 2004, Colombia in 2006, 
Niger in 2009, and Belarus in 2006.112  
Gideon Maltz likewise notes twenty-six instances in which presidents 
chose not to comply with relevant term limits between 1992 and 2006: fourteen 
of these instances involved the amendment or repeal of relevant limits, while 
twelve involved some form of constitutional “over-staying” or breach of the 
relevant limit.113 Six of these countries were constitutional democracies at the 
time of the relevant constitutional non-compliance.114 
In Africa, Posner and Young note the amendment or repeal of 
constitutional term limits between 1990 and 2005 in Chad, Gabon, Guinea, 
Namibia, Togo and Uganda.115 The incumbent president in each case ultimately 
won the relevant election, such that these changes led to a third consecutive 
presidential term for Presidents Idriss Débby of Chad, Omar Bongo of Gabon, 
Lansana Conté of Guinea, Samuel Nujoma of Namibia, Gnassingbé Eyadéma of 
Togo, and Yoweri Museveni of Uganda.116  
Denis Tull and Claudia Simons extended this analysis to 2016 and found 
that, of the thirty-nine presidents in Africa who reached the end of their 
constitutionally permitted time in office, eighteen chose not to comply with 
relevant term limits, but instead chose to circumvent or to formally amend those 
limits.117 Attempts at formal constitutional change were met with an extremely 
 
 105. Id. at 1849.  
 106. Id.  
 107.  Tomas Guardia Gutierrez, where there was a single term limit with non-immediate reelection not 
permitted. Ginsburg et al., supra note 1, at 1851–52.  
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 112. See id. at 1869–72. 
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 115.  See Posner & Young, supra note 100, at 132–34. In Guinea, the relevant amendment also repealed all 
term limits, thereby allowing President Lansana Conté the possibility of indefinite reelection. See Baker, supra 
note 8, at 291–92.  
 116. Posner & Young, supra note 100, at 133–34. On how changes in Guinea and Burkina Faso have led to 
the scope for indefinite reelection in those countries, see Baker, supra note 8, at 291–92.  
 117. See Tull & Simons, supra note 53, at 83–85.  
378 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:359 
high rate of success. For instance, out of the eighteen presidential attempts to 
formally amend term limits, fifteen succeeded, compared to only three cases of 
failure.118  
Perhaps the most comprehensive study of term limits evasion to date has 
been carried out by Mila Versteeg and several coauthors, in which they studied 
106 countries.119 Since 2000, of 234 constitutionally-required presidential exits 
from office, there were 60 cases of attempted evasion of existing term limits.120 
Thus, like Ginsburg and Elkins, they find that attempted term limits evasion 
occurs about 25% of the time.121  
By far the most common tool to evade term limits is formal amendment to 
the constitution, which removes or loosens the term limit.122 But this is not the 
only tool that incumbent presidents wishing to stay in power possess. The study 
also outlines other techniques that are used fairly commonly. One is to replace 
the entire constitution, which often has the effect of resetting the clock on term 
limits.123 Another is to go to the judiciary and to convince it to reinterpret the 
term limit or to throw it out entirely.124 These latter techniques may actually be 
more damaging to the rule of law than constitutional amendment, since they may 
have collateral costs to stability or to judicial independence.  
Consider the problem through a number of recent cases, drawn first from 
Africa. In 2008, the parliament of Cameroon voted to amend its constitution to 
remove all presidential term limits, thereby allowing President Paul Biya to 
extend his term beyond the twenty-five years he had already served.125 Similarly, 
in 2012 in Senegal, supporters of President Abdoulaye Wade successfully 
proposed amending the constitution to allow him to run for a third term, despite 
significant public protests.126 The only silver lining from a democratic 
perspective was that the amendment process galvanized a new grass-roots 
political opposition movement that defeated Wade’s actual bid for reelection.127 
In 2010, the Djibouti parliament voted to remove presidential term limits 
from its constitution, to shorten the presidential term to five years, and to impose 
 
 118. See id. at 85. 
 119. Versteeg et al., supra note 4. 
 120. See id.  
 121. See supra text accompanying note 90. 
 122. See Versteeg et al., supra note 4. 
 123. See id.  
 124. See id.  
 125. LeBas, supra note 58, at 171; Cameroon Parliament Extends Biya’s Term Limit, FR.24, 
http://www.france24.com/en/20080411-cameroon-parliament-paul-biya-term-limit-extension (last updated 
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 126. See Lamin Jahateh, Controversy of Abdoulaye Wade’s Presidential Bid, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 28, 2012), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/01/201212712295177724.html. 
 127. See LeBas, supra note 58, at 171.  
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a mandatory retirement age of seventy-five for the president.128 These 
amendments paved the way for President Ismael Omar Guelleh to stand for 
reelection for a third term in 2011 and a fourth term in 2016.129 Guelleh was 
ultimately re-elected in 2016 with 87% of the vote, against a backdrop of 
significant alleged political repression and electoral irregularities.130 
In 2015, the Rwandan parliament passed a constitutional amendment, 
which was then approved at a national referendum, to reduce presidential term 
limits from seven to five years.131 In addition, the Rwandan parliament also 
created a set of “transitional” arrangements that allowed the winner of the 2017 
presidential election to serve an initial transitional seven-year term, and 
subsequently be eligible for two additional five-year terms.132 In aggregate, these 
changes created the possibility for President Paul Kagame to stay in office for a 
further seventeen years, until 2034.133  
In in the lead up to the 2020 Burundi presidential elections, President 
Nkurunziza, who had already served for three terms, proposed changes to the 
Burundi constitution to allow him to seek reelection for two more consecutive 
terms.134 Following his reelection to a third term in 2015, he appointed a 
commission to consider the possibility of further constitutional amendments.135 
After a process of public consultation, the commission announced its 
recommendation to extend presidential term limits from five to seven years.136 
The commission also recommended various parallel changes to the power of the 
presidency.137 Despite criticisms of the commission, and its processes, the 
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proposed changes were subsequently approved by voters at a national 
referendum in 2018.138 
Another method used to circumvent presidential term limits in Africa is 
through the use of the judiciary. For example, in Burundi, President Pierre 
Nkurunziza’s party, in 2015, asked the Constitutional Court of Burundi to find 
that the existing term limits did not apply to President Nkurunziza because he 
was elected under transitional provisions that provided for indirect, 
parliamentary election rather than direct elections.139 The court upheld the 
argument, finding that the transitional provisions operated separately from the 
provisions imposing presidential term limits.140 The court’s decision ultimately 
paved the way for President Nkurunziza to be re-elected for a third term.141 
A similar pattern of evasion applies in Latin America.142 Between 1993 and 
2009, Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia all passed formal constitutional changes 
that relaxed constitutional term limits and allowed some scope for presidential 
reelection.143 Ecuador and Venezuela formally repealed term limits altogether 
so presidents could seek indefinite reelection.144 In both countries, the changes 
were passed despite a tiered constitutional design that required a more 
demanding standard when attempting to alter the fundamental structure of the 
constitution.145 In Ecuador, for example, changes to the “fundamental structure, 
or the nature and constituent elements of the State” require a referendum, 
whereas most other changes can be carried out by Parliament alone.146 Despite 
compelling arguments that the elimination of all term limits would be the type 
of fundamental change that would require a more demanding procedure,147 
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presidents in both countries used the less demanding default standard, and the 
high courts allowed them to do so.148  
In another class of Latin American countries, courts played a more direct 
role and actively removed presidential term limits from their constitution by 
holding that the term limits themselves were unconstitutional. This route was 
generally taken in cases where presidents lacked the ability to make formal 
changes to the constitution that eradicated term limits. In 2009, for example, the 
Nicaraguan Supreme Court held that a constitutional term limit that would have 
prevented President Ortega from running for a third term in office was 
unconstitutional.149 The court set the term limit aside, allowing Ortega to run for 
and subsequently win a new term.150 Once Ortega had sufficient parliamentary 
support, his allies passed an amendment formally removing the term limit, and 
he has remained in power ever since.151  
In 2015, the Honduran court used a similar maneuver to remove a 
supposedly unamendable term limit,152 allowing President Juan Orlando 
Hernandez to run for, and subsequently win, reelection.153 Similarly, in Bolivia, 
after losing a referendum to extend presidential term limits that would allow 
Bolivian President Evo Morales to run for a fourth consecutive term,154 Morales 
turned to the judiciary.155 The Bolivian Constitutional Court obliged by holding 
that the constitutional term limit was unconstitutional,156 which paved the way 
for Morales to run for reelection indefinitely.157 
There have been formal changes to term limits in other regions. For 
example, term limits have recently been relaxed or repealed in Belarus, 
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Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.158 In 2016, voters in Tajikistan voted to 
approve a referendum to exempt the sitting President, Emomali Rahmon, from 
all term limits under the 1994 Constitution, on the basis that he brought the 
country “peace” and unity.159 The relevant changes were approved by the 
Constitutional Court of Tajikistan in 2016 and aligned with the 1999 
amendments that lengthened the presidential term limit from five to seven 
years.160 
Presidential attempts to lengthen or remove term limits have a high success 
rate. Versteeg et al., for example, found forty successes out of the sixty attempts 
since 2000.161 This suggests that constitutional entrenchment of term limits has 
not been especially successful, a problem that we explore in more detail in the 
next Part. That said, there have been some prominent cases where presidents 
tried and failed to change or evade their term limits, and we survey those cases 
here. 
In Africa, for example, between 1990 and 2016, attempts to evade term 
limits failed in Zambia in 2001, Malawi in 2002, Nigeria in 2006, Senegal in 
2011, and Burkina Faso in 2014.162 In Zambia, President Frederick Chiluba tried 
but failed to amend the constitution to allow a run for a third term in office.163 
Chiluba’s attempts to extend his term faced widespread popular opposition, as 
well as opposition from within his own party.164 Fifteen senior members of the 
ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) publicly opposed the 
amendment, and fifty-nine MMD legislators, including the Vice President, 
signed a document vowing to oppose the President gaining a third term.165 
Ultimately, Chiluba resigned.166  
In Malawi, President Bakili Mulizi failed to amend the constitution to 
allow a run for a third term because the amendment fell three votes short of 
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achieving a two-thirds super-majority in the legislature needed for successful 
passage.167  
In Nigeria, President Olusegun Obasango’s attempt to run for a third term 
was blocked by the Senate after a parliamentary minority voted against the 
proposal from Obasango’s supporters to remove the existing two-presidential 
term limit from the Nigerian constitution.168  This failed attempt occurred against 
the backdrop of two previous military coups in Nigeria (in 1963–66 and 1979–
83), and thus represents a notable instance of successful democratic 
entrenchment.169 
In Senegal, President Wade was met with broad opposition when he 
proposed to amend the constitution in 2011 to allow a third term in office.170 The 
civil society organization “M23” (named after protests held on May 23), or 
“Y’en a Marre,” led to mass demonstrations against the proposed changes; 
ultimately, Wade withdrew the proposed changes from parliament.171 While he 
still chose to run for a third term in the 2011 presidential elections, despite 
contravening the constitution’s two-term limit, he was defeated in the polls by 
the opposition candidate.172 
In Burkina Faso, plans by President Compaoré to amend the constitution 
to seek a third presidential term in 2014 were met with mass public protest. 
Inspired by their counterparts in Senegal, citizens in Burkina Faso formed a 
protest movement entitled “Le Balai Citoyen” (Citizen Broom) calling for 
Compaoré to leave office and the parliament to reject the proposed constitutional 
changes.173 Their rallying cry was “Hands off my Constitution.”174 In the short-
term, these protests triggered, or at least provided a pretext for, a major 
regression in commitments to constitutional democracy in the country.175 They 
led Compaoré to dissolve the parliament and the military to announce a take-
over of the government.176 However, continued protests led the military to re-
instate civilian rule and call for fresh democratic elections in 2015, in which the 
opposition candidate Roch Marc Christian Kaboré won a majority.177 
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In Latin America, there have also been several failed attempts to change 
term limits in recent years.178 For example, in 2010, an attempt by President 
Alvaro Uribe was blocked by a decision of the Colombian Constitutional Court, 
which held that allowing a third consecutive term in office would be 
unconstitutional because it would clash with core constitutional principles, such 
as the separation of powers.179 Versteeg et al. found that this was the only time 
since 2000 that a court successfully blocked an attempted change to presidential 
term limits.180 
In Panama in 1998 and Bolivia in 2016, attempts to change presidential 
term limits through referendum were defeated by voters.181 However in Bolivia, 
as noted above, Morales eventually succeeded by successfully petitioning the 
judiciary to remove the term limit.182 In 2009, a possible attempt by Manuel 
Zelaya of Honduras to change a one-term limit was blocked by the military, 
which ousted the incumbent in a coup.183 Finally, in 2017, an attempt by Horacio 
Cartes of Paraguay to loosen presidential term limits via amendment failed in 
the House of Representatives in the face of massive popular protests.184 The 
attempt at change via amendment was undertaken despite a constitutional text 
that appeared to lay out with clarity that changes to presidential term limits 
require a Constituent Assembly and cannot be undertaken using the normal 
amendment mechanism.185 A number of civil society groups, with the support 
of the powerful Paraguayan Catholic Church, mobilized in opposition to the 
measure.186 At one stage the Congress was even set on fire.187 
Thus, attempted changes or evasions of presidential term limits to benefit 
incumbents are quite common. While there have been cases where presidents 
have failed to achieve their goals of loosening or eliminating term limits, often 
in the face of popular mobilization, evasion attempts are usually successful.  
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IV.  THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE  
The prior two Parts showed that, while presidential term limits are 
extremely common, compliance with those provisions is problematic. 
Incumbents use a range of tools, including constitutional amendment, 
constitutional replacement, or the judiciary, to extend their tenure in office. This 
Part asks two questions using the data of the prior section.  
First, why are presidents often so determined to evade presidential term 
limits? We root the issue in incentives. Second, what are the consequences of 
presidential evasion of term limits? While the consequences obviously vary by 
case, we think they are often very negative for constitutional democracy. Thus, 
the term limits problem is one in urgent need of solutions. 
A. THE CAUSES OF EVASION 
What explains this pattern of weak compliance with relevant constitutional 
limits? A range of factors are likely at play, including a limited history of respect 
for constitutional limits in certain countries, the difficulty of constraining the 
power of already extremely long-serving and dominant presidents, and the 
insufficient entrenchment of relevant limits. However, we assert that the core 
problem is one of presidential incentives.  
Where a president has already served substantially more than two terms, 
they may gain so much power that it becomes extremely difficult to dislodge 
them. They may enjoy strong public support and tight control over the military, 
and thus have a high capacity to withstand the threat of forcible removal from 
office.188  
Another problem is that some countries, in which term limits have been 
removed, have imposed weak entrenchment of their term limits, and require only 
ordinary legislative majority requirements for the amendment or repeal of such 
provisions. They have not increased entrenchment to these provisions or placed 
them on a higher constitutional “tier” that requires some form of heightened 
super-majority or double-majority support.189  Countries that have made term 
limits especially easy to change are likely to be vulnerable to attacks on those 
limits. 
In Africa, for example, Tull and Simons note that, of the fifteen cases of 
successful amendment to term limits, five of these occurred by way of 
amendments approved by parliaments using procedures similar to those for 
ordinary statutes.190 This was the case in Namibia in 1999, Togo in 2002, Gabon 
in 2003, Cameroon in 2008, and Djibouti in 2010.191  
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In contrast, heightened super-majority requirements might be more likely 
to lead to the defeat of proposed amendments to presidential term limits, even in 
cases where a dominant party controls the legislature. In Burundi, for example, 
before turning to the court to ratify his bid for a third term, President Nkurunziza 
had first sought formally to amend relevant term limits through the legislature.192 
The proposed amendments failed to gain the necessary super-majority of the 
Burundi Parliament by only a single vote.193 This failure was largely because 
Article 96 of the Burundi Constitution required amendments to receive the 
support of at least 80% of the legislature,194 an especially high super-majority 
requirement in global terms.195  
A lack of constitutional entrenchment does not fully explain why 
presidents often choose not to comply with term limits, and it is far from a 
complete protection against evasion attempts. As noted above in Part III, in 
many cases, incumbents have used tools other than formal amendment to 
achieve their goals, such as constitutional replacement and judicial review. 
Merely creating a high level of entrenchment against constitutional change will 
not prevent the use of these other evasion tactics, and may indeed provide 
additional incentive for their use, because they provide a substitute for formal 
change. 
Presidents facing a binding term-limit face a range of incentives not to 
leave office. One incentive for a president to evade a term limit is to prevent or 
delay the almost immediate reduction in a president’s power and privileges once 
they leave office. Some democracies include provisions maintaining some of a 
president’s privileges once they leave office, for example by continuing to 
provide them with a salary, generous allowances, security, and staff.196 As we 
explore further below, the continued possession of presidential privileges is 
extremely important to providing presidents the incentive to leave at the 
constitutionally appointed time.  
Even where they retain these privileges, presidents will inevitably face 
some loss in their power and influence when they leave office. In addition, 
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leaving office inevitably means losing the ability to protect themselves from the 
threat of future prosecution, imprisonment, or confiscation of their assets. There 
is an increasing trend globally toward holding former leaders accountable for 
international crimes, a risk which constitutions cannot “insure” former 
presidents against.197 This is one reason, Tom Ginsburg has suggested, that 
democratic elites may agree to bind themselves to a minimum set of 
constitutional guarantees.198 Guarantees of this kind, however, will always be 
subject to the danger of downstream renegotiation or nullification.199  
In new or fragile democracies, presidents may face few countervailing 
pressures to abide by term limits. In more consolidated constitutional systems, 
political parties may exert pressure on presidents to abide by the terms of a 
democratic constitution. Because parties have a long-term interest in preserving 
their reputation for respecting constitutional limitations, they may encourage the 
president to step aside in favor of another member of the party. This reflects a 
broader pattern in which long-term political actors may contribute to what 
political scientists have called “self-enforcing” or “self-stabilizing” 
constitutional term limitations.200 As scholars such as Tonja Jacobi, Sonia 
Mittal, and Barry Weingast have argued, constitutional term limits can be self-
stabilizing in two key ways.201  
First, constitutional term limits “lower[] the stakes of [democratic] 
politics,” and therefore give political actors an incentive to support constitutional 
action over extra-constitutional action.202 Second, constitutional term limits 
create a focal point for co-ordination among political actors, which can help 
solve problems of co-ordination in ordinary politics.203 Furthermore, 
constitutional term limits are a classic mechanism for lowering the stakes of 
democratic elections of a political party because they reduce the prospect of a 
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single party gaining long-term control of the state or state power by winning a 
single election.204  
Many fragile democracies, however, lack strong, independent political 
parties with this kind of long-term interest in the alternation of political power.205 
Parties are often a vehicle for a single candidate to run for office, and they define 
their policies in terms identical to those of a president or leader. Rightly or 
wrongly, a political party’s electoral fate is often perceived by party members as 
tied to that leader. When it comes time for a president to leave office under a 
term limit, the party thus has little incentive to encourage a president to comply 
with the relevant constitutional limitation. Instead of encouraging a president to 
leave office, parties in a fragile democracy may actively encourage a president 
to stay beyond the constitutional term limit as a means of increasing the chances 
that the party itself will continue to hold power.206  
Latin America is a sobering reminder of the extraordinary length to which 
presidents will go to overcome even a well-drafted constitutional design in 
pursuit of their goals to remain in office. For example, both Venezuela and 
Ecuador attempted to prevent changes to the “fundamental structure” of its 
constitution by requiring a more demanding procedure to make any 
constitutional amendments that would extend a president’s tenure beyond the 
constitutional term limit.207 Nonetheless, presidents were still able to circumvent 
constitutional term limits using a procedure with a lower standard, and then have 
high courts they controlled validate those maneuvers.208  
An even more dramatic example is given by countries like Nicaragua, 
Bolivia, and Honduras, where courts issued decisions directly removing the 
presidential term limits. In Bolivia, the regime-dominated court did so after 
President Morales had already lost a referendum that would allow him to run for 
another term.209 Honduras was even more dramatic. The Honduran Court 
removed a strict one-term limit that was part of the original 1982 Constitution, 
which included an “eternity” clause that supposedly made the Constitution 
unamendable and punished any political attempt to change the limit.210 While an 
earlier president, Manuel Zelaya, had been removed in a military coup after 
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allegedly seeking to change the clause,211 incumbent president Juan Orlando 
Hernandez successfully evaded the limit by leaning on the judiciary to do his 
dirty work for him.212 
B. THE RISKS POSED BY TERM LIMIT EVASIONS 
This pattern of non-compliance with constitutional term limits has 
significant costs, or risks, from a democratic perspective. Some scholars suggest 
that the formal removal of term limits constitutes a form of “hard” contravention, 
whereas constitutional over-staying is a “softer” form of contravention.213 
However, formal constitutional change and constitutional non-compliance both 
pose distinct dangers to constitutional democracy. Formal amendments 
permanently remove key democratic checks and balances, whereas non-
compliance undermines basic commitments to the rule of law. 
Presidents who simply ignore constitutional term limits are likely to 
undermine a culture of respect for the rule of law. A disregard for constitutional 
term limits can encourage disrespect of other constitutional limitations by other 
government officials, including limitations on their power and prohibitions 
against corruption. It may even encourage popular disobedience of legal rules 
and thus an increase in looting, violence, and other forms of disrespect for legal 
norms. 
Other “informal” approaches to circumventing term limits can also put 
pressure on the rule of law. One of the hallmarks of the rule of law, most scholars 
agree, is that it involves respect for the independence of the judiciary and a 
willingness to follow judicial decisions.214 Judicial independence is, of course, 
a question of degree.  
Some scholars argue in favor of a “dialogic” or “departmentalist” approach 
to constitutional construction,215 where legislative or executive officials are 
entitled to give narrow effect to court decisions with which they disagree, or to 
disregard certain aspects of courts’ reasonings. However, there is no suggestion 
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among constitutional scholars that the executive should be free to influence the 
outcome of specific judicial decisions.216 
In Burundi, for example, there were several reports of direct interference 
by the President and his supporters regarding the independence of the Burundi 
Constitutional Court in 2015 during its deliberations over the application of 
presidential term limits.217 The Vice President of the Court, Sylvère 
Nimpagaritse, refused to sign his name to the opinion and immediately fled to 
Rwanda upon it being handed down.218 In a Radio France International 
broadcast, Nimpagaritse reported that the Burundi Constitutional Court had been 
subject to intense political pressure in the lead-up to its decision, and that several 
judges had received death threats before changing their vote to uphold the 
constitutionality of the President’s third term.219 Later, in Belgium, 
Nimpagaritse identified specific judges in the majority who changed their 
position due to such threats and discussed the threats made against him and his 
family on behalf of the President.220 
 Formal processes of amending or repealing term limits can erode 
democratic checks and balances. In a few cases, presidents have been forced to 
commit to constitutional changes that limit their power in order to obtain 
political support for proposed changes to constitutional term limits. John Carey 
notes that concessions of this kind can make the removal of term limits 
significantly less damaging to democracy.221 Scholars, such as Javier Corrales 
and Michael Penfold, suggest that in some cases, where cross-party political 
negotiations are at play, changes to term limits “can enhance accountability and 
strengthen checks and balances.”222  
Presidents may make more substantial concessions to the opposition and 
trade broader changes that limit the power of the presidency in exchange for 
support to extend the term limit. In Argentina, for example, to gain support for 
proposed changes to existing term limits, President Carlos Menem was required 
to work with opposition legislators.223 To secure their agreement for a formal 
 
 216. See generally Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 606 (2008) (arguing that this would create some sort of “dead hand” control over constitutional 
interpretation).  
 217.  See Vandeginste, supra note 139, at 53. 
 218. Busingye Kabumba, A Legal Expert’s View on Burundi Term Limits Saga, OBSERVER (May 13, 2015), 
https://observer.ug/viewpoint/37809-a-legal-expert-s-view-on-burundi-term-limits-saga; Vandeginste, supra 
note 139, at 53. 
 219. See Vandeginste, supra note 139; Kabumba, supra note 218.  
 220. See Jerome Delay, Exiled Burundi Judge Says Court Forced to Back President, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB. (May 6, 2015, 10:44 PM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-burundi-opposition-politician-
arrested-over-2015may06-story.html. Note that this account was also contested. See Burundi Court Backs 
President Nkurunziza on Third-Term, BBC NEWS (May 5, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
32588658 (disputing the Vice President’s account of the court receiving these threats).  
 221. See Carey, supra note 53. 
 222. See Corrales & Penfold, supra note 31, at 162.  
 223. See Carey, supra note 53, at 128; Corrales & Penfold, supra note 31, at 160 (describing the so-called 
“Olivos Pact”); Ginsburg et al., supra note 1, at 1831–32.  
February 2020] CONSTITUTIONAL END GAMES 391 
change to term limits, Menem also agreed to reverse previous changes limiting 
the independence of the Argentinian Supreme Court—Menem agreed to restore 
the previous size of the bench and to appoint new, more independent judges.224 
This meant that the court was able to act as a greater check on the President and 
his constitutional ambitions.225  
This will not be the case where concessions are simply designed to co-opt 
members of the political opposition without making real changes. In the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, President Kabila attempted to 
diffuse criticism of his attempts to circumvent term limits by appointing the 
leader of the opposition as Prime Minister.226 It was unlikely that the 
appointment was a genuine attempt to share power with the opposition or reduce 
the powers of the president.  
Furthermore, the process of amending constitutional term limits may more 
commonly create a window of opportunity for would-be authoritarian leaders to 
achieve even broader forms of anti-democratic change. This is especially true 
where presidents choose to repeal term limits via a process of wholescale 
constitutional replacement, but similar effects may also be achieved by 
amendment. 
In Venezuela, for example, formal changes to existing constitutional term 
limits were made by President Hugo Chavez without any meaningful opposition 
involvement or support.227 The first attempt, a referendum that narrowly failed 
in 2007, was paired with a series of measures that would have greatly expanded 
and centralized the power of the presidency.228 While most of the broader 
measures were dropped when Chavez passed a narrower measure eliminating 
term limits in 2009, he was able to ultimately pass these measures through a 
series of ordinary laws.229 
Likewise, in Algeria, the parliament voted in 2008 to repeal presidential 
term limits, which would allow President Abdelaziz Bouteflika to seek a third 
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term in office.230 In passing these amendments, the parliament also approved a 
parallel set of constitutional amendments that increased the scope of presidential 
power and reduced the power of the prime minister.231 This kind of “bundling” 
is quite common in processes of formal constitutional change, especially those 
that involve voting by ordinary voters at a referendum.  
In Burundi, voters were asked to vote on fundamental constitutional 
changes as a single bundle.232 Leading news reports suggested that the ballot 
paper did not contain any specific proposal for constitutional change, but rather 
asked voters to vote “yes” or “no” in favor of the “constitutional referendum of 
May 2018.”233 As a result, the previous two-term limit on presidents was 
removed and the length of each term increased from five to seven years.234 The 
changes also resulted in the creation of new offices for a prime minister that was 
appointed by the president and a ceremonial vice president, which would be of 
a different ethnicity to the president, and the removal of provisions that required 
two vice presidents of different ethnicities.235 Moreover, the bundled vote led to 
the removal of the right to representation in cabinet for small parties.236 It also 
led to the removal of other power-sharing principles, such as norms of parity in 
various parts of government service, including the police,237 that were part of the 
“Arusha Accords” that helped end the previous civil war in Burundi.238 The net 
effect of these changes, most commentators agreed, undermined Burundi’s 
status as a stable, multi-ethnic democracy, and impaired the capacity of the 
political opposition from rival ethnic groups to effectively challenge the 
President.239 As a result, the President’s practice of issue bundling relaxed 
presidential term limits, which effectively expanded presidential power and 
removed commitments to a multi-party, multi-ethnic democracy.240 
In most democracies, the issue bundling was not as crude as in Burundi, 
where voters were given no formal legal opportunity to support selected or 
limited forms of constitutional change. But democratic leaders can still, and 
often, draw political connections between distinct legal proposals for change, so 
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that supporters of one change vote in support of other changes that they know 
less about or have less strong views about.  
Thus, the formal removal of constitutional term limits can pose a double 
danger to democracy. It can not only lead to a reduction in the competitiveness 
of presidential elections and greater risk of informal abuses by presidents, but 
also a formal increase in the scope of presidential power.241 The process of 
overcoming term limits may also pose other dangers to democracy. It may 
provoke a form of political crisis that leads to the death or injury of hundreds of 
citizens and calls for military or martial rule.242 Political crises almost always 
have somewhat unpredictable results. And they often threaten the stability of the 
existing constitutional order.243 
V.  SOLVING THE END-GAME PROBLEM: THE ROLE OF CONSECUTIVE TERM 
LIMITS 
Constitutional designers can ameliorate the risks of term limit evasion by 
barring only consecutive terms. As noted above in Part II, a common model 
globally is the American one, where presidents are prohibited from regaining the 
presidency for their entire lives after serving two consecutive terms in office.244 
A few systems go even further and prohibit reelection forever after only one 
term in office.245 This kind of term limit, however, maximizes the incentive 
problem. If presidents can never return to power, they may try to hold on to it at 
all costs.  
In contrast, a less popular but still fairly common design choice is to bar 
only consecutive attempts at reelection. One of the first bans of this kind was in 
the Argentinian Constitution of 1853.246 As noted in Table 1, as of 2019, we find 
that eight percent of systems bar presidents from holding an immediately 
consecutive term after one term in office; while another seven percent bar them 
from doing so after holding two terms in office.247 In both designs, however, 
presidents can return to power later. We assert that such a model gives presidents 
greater incentives to leave office rather than seeking to bend term limits to their 
will. 
A. CHANGING PRESIDENTIAL INCENTIVES  
If presidents can one day stand again for election to the presidency, they 
face a different calculus as to the attractiveness of evasion attempts. While 
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compliance means foregoing the immediate powers and privileges of office, 
attempted evasion may risk undermining a leader’s reputation in ways that 
damage their long-term reelection prospects.  
Whether this long-term risk is sufficient to outweigh the immediate 
benefits of non-compliance will depend on a range of factors, including the age 
of an incumbent, as well as prevailing social, economic, and political conditions. 
The younger a president is, the lower the “discount rate” they will generally have 
when trading off current versus future political gains. All else being equal, 
younger presidents are more likely to respond to the incentives created by 
temporary bans on reelection. 
Other factors may also affect a president’s choice regarding whether to step 
down. If the economy is strong, for example, a risk-averse president may risk 
damaging their long-term chance of reelection, and instead pursue a high 
possibility of immediate reelection by seeking to repeal or circumvent current 
term limits.248 The same is true for presidents with a high rate of voter approval. 
Approval ratings indicate a high chance of reelection and strong support for 
formal constitutional amendment to make reelection possible.249 Conversely, if 
economic conditions are declining, or if a government is faced with voter 
dissatisfaction, a president may have greater reason to prioritize his or her 
chances of long-term reelection.250 
There is strong empirical evidence to suggest that the prospect of later 
reelection is a relevant factor in presidents’ actual decision-making. Corrales and 
Penfold identify eleven countries in Latin America that barred consecutive terms 
but allowed presidential reelection after one or two intervening terms.251 In those 
eleven countries, they found that former presidents ran in 50% of elections in 
which they were eligible to run.252 Some of these elections—Argentina in 2003, 
Bolivia in 1997 and 2002, Haiti in 2006, and Suriname in 2000 and 2005—
actually featured more than one former president.253 
There have been several recent instances of presidents “voluntarily” 
choosing to leave office at the end of their constitutionally appointed terms in 
office because of the possibility of running for reelection in the future. In 
Ecuador, as previously noted, Congress, in 2015, passed a constitutional 
amendment that allowed indefinite presidential reelection.254 This was done 
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using the default procedure for amendment, rather than the more demanding 
procedure for constitutional changes that affect the “fundamental structure.”255 
As a result, President Correa was able to avoid a popular referendum that the 
opposition sought and he feared.256  
When faced with significant street protests, Correa agreed to bless a small 
but significant last-minute change to the amendment: the elimination of 
presidential term limits that would take place only after the next election in 
2017.257 Effectively, this change meant that Correa would need to leave power 
in 2017, although he could potentially run for reelection and remain in the 
presidency indefinitely. His hand-picked successor, Lenin Moreno, won a 
narrow victory in the 2017 election.258 However, as explained in more detail 
below, Moreno quickly turned against Correa, and one of his first major acts was 
to hold a successful referendum reinstating presidential term limits, blocking 
Correa’s return to power.259 
The Ecuadorian case has been celebrated as one of “democracy’s near 
misses”: a set of cases where democratic constitutionalism was close to suffering 
major erosion towards authoritarianism, but escaped long-term damage in the 
end.260 Correa was widely viewed as a significant threat to democracy.261 He 
took a number of formal and informal steps to consolidate power, including 
replacing the existing constitution with a new one unilaterally drafted by his 
political allies, and used an expanding set of legal tools to harass opposing 
political, civil society, and media groups.262 Scholars have asserted that Ecuador 
had already eroded into a competitive authoritarian regime during Correa’s 
tenure.263 The temporary term limit that emerged from the 2015 crisis and forced 
Correa’s exit from power should thus be given considerable credit in salvaging 
a democratic constitutional order.  
We do not know exactly why Correa agreed to the provision preventing 
him from running in the 2017 election, but it seems highly likely that the fairly 
young incumbent president did so because he thought he could return to power 
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later. Indeed, some provisions of the design made it possible for Correa to return 
without sitting out a full presidential term.264 Many analysts predicted economic 
and fiscal problems for Ecuador during the period in which Correa left power,265 
making it particularly attractive for him to take a break before making a 
triumphant return. At the same time, the case shows that temporarily forcing 
would-be autocrats out of power may have dramatic effects on a country’s 
democratic trajectory, even when their own party retains the presidency. 
In Panama, during the lead-up to the 2014 presidential election, President 
Martinelli enjoyed a 60% approval rating but faced a binding term limit that 
prevented him from seeking reelection.266 He initially sought to propose 
constitutional changes aimed at removing these limits from the Constitution.267  
First, Martinelli proposed a formal constitutional amendment to allow 
presidents to serve two consecutive terms.268 However, he faced significant 
resistance from within his own party.269 His Vice President, Juan Carlos Varela, 
publicly opposed the measure, and effectively began his bid to challenge 
Martinelli for the presidency.270 
Second, Martinelli proposed measures designed informally to reduce the 
effect of term limits by seeking to appoint new justices to the Supreme Court of 
Panama who would be willing to invalidate the existing term limits as an 
unconstitutional provision.271 Nicaragua provided an important model for 
informal change of this kind.272 In proposing to recreate a “Fifth Court” or 
chamber in the Supreme Court that would be responsible for constitutional cases, 
and that would staffed entirely by judges appointed by the President, Martinelli 
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sought to use similar tactics.273 He only ultimately backed down in the face of 
widespread public protest.274 
When these attempts failed, Martinelli chose to step aside and declined to 
contest the 2014 presidential election.275 Instead, Martinelli chose to support 
former Housing Minister, Jose Domingo Arias, as a presidential candidate, and 
to promote Martinelli’s wife, Marta Linares, as a Vice Presidential candidate.276 
He broke with convention for an ex-president and actively campaigned for Arias 
and his own wife.277 Martinelli also repeatedly defended Arias’ achievements in 
reducing unemployment and promoting economic growth, and warned that these 
gains could be reversed if the opposition’s candidates were elected.278 Martinelli 
took on an active campaign role despite the risk of corruption and other criminal 
charges that he was facing.279 As a result of these investigations, in 2015 
Martinelli left Panama and moved to the United States, where he faced 
extradition proceedings,280 before subsequently returning to Panama. 
Martinelli’s decision to step down from the presidency likely reflected a 
desire to maintain his long-term reputation and to preserve his capacity to run in 
future presidential elections after the two-term “cooling off” period for which 
the Constitution provides. He sought to run for mayor of Panama City in 2019 
and would have been the front runner, but the Electoral Court rejected his 
candidacy as he failed to comply with residency requirements since he fled to 
the United States for several years before returning to Panama.281 He has also 
stated that he intends to be a candidate for president in 2024 following the two-
term cooling off period.282  
We add one additional piece of relevant evidence. Despite being a country 
with considerable political turmoil, Brazil has nonetheless been devoid of 
attempts to eliminate or loosen term limits. Brazil has had two presidential 
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removals via impeachment since its return to democracy,283 and many other 
crises, but no serious attempts at evasion of term limits. In some cases, such as 
during and after the presidency of the popular incumbent Luiz Inacio Lula da 
Silva, the possibility of a return to power was clearly relevant. Lula planned on 
running for power in 2018, after his successor, Dilma Rousseff, was impeached 
and removed. However, his candidacy was stopped by a corruption investigation 
that left him in jail.284  
These examples might be added to others, such as the case of Cristina 
Kirchner in Argentina, which is considered in more detail below, in which the 
prospect of a subsequent return to power seems to have impacted presidential 
decisions not to proceed with evasion attempts. These examples are not, of 
course, a proper “test” of our theory, and we do not attempt such a test here. An 
empirical test would be, at any rate, difficult to carry out in a convincing way, 
given the relative rarity of the consecutive model and the large number of factors 
that impact evasion attempts and their success. 
B. ARE CONSECUTIVE BANS STRONG ENOUGH? 
One response to our argument above may be that weak or temporary term 
limits are in fact “successful” in avoiding evasion only because term limits 
merely defer, rather than reduce, the dangers to democracy posed by personalist 
presidential rule. As we noted above, many presidents facing temporary bans on 
reelection go on to stand at subsequent democratic elections.285 Some have also 
ultimately re-assumed the role of the would-be authoritarian leader after 
returning to power (for example, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Congolese 
President Denis Sassou-Nguesso, and Dominican President Rafael Trujillo in 
the 1940s).286 It remains to be seen whether some recent Latin American 
presidents, such as Martinelli, will succeed in recapturing the presidency.  
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There are, however, two key dynamics that suggest that a delay in a 
president’s ability to seek reelection is likely to reduce the risk of a slide toward 
authoritarianism, and not simply to postpone its occurrence. 
First, a delay creates a window of opportunity for alternative leaders to 
emerge. When a president steps down from power, his or her successor will often 
begin to build up power, thus blunting the consolidation of power of the prior 
incumbent.287 An important benefit of non-consecutive term limits, therefore, is 
that term limits can provide a window of opportunity for the strengthening of 
political parties as structures independent from the individual president or 
leader. 
Sometimes, this occurs because the president’s chosen successor, lacking 
the advantages of the incumbent, loses the next election. Consider Panama, 
where, as noted above, President Martinelli stepped down and his chosen 
candidate lost to Juan Carlos Varela, his former vice president, turned 
adversary.288 Varela took power in an increasingly difficult economic and social 
situation, and his approval ratings declined fairly rapidly.289 However, he took 
advantage of the presidency to develop policies that built on, but were quite 
distinct from, Martinelli’s.290 While he continued anti-poverty projects and 
large-scale public infrastructure projects, such as the expansion of the Panama 
Canal, he argued for increased transparency and action to combat global money 
laundering in Panama.291 Furthermore, he introduced new policies designed to 
increase food affordability, and lobbied for rebuilding democratic and social 
institutions.292 As a result, support for Varela’s Democratic Revolutionary Party 
(PRD) increased and support for Martinelli’s Cambio Democratico (CD) party 
declined.293 Between 2015 and 2018, 119,660 voters chose to leave the CD 
party, leaving it with only 338,842 registered members, compared to the PRD 
with 462,395 members.294 In effect, non-consecutive term limits allowed Varela 
to build his own base of support, while Martinelli’s eroded. 
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Strikingly, similar dynamics often hold even where the winner of the next 
election was handpicked by the old president. Consider two recent cases from 
Latin America: Colombia and Ecuador.  
In Colombia, as noted above, the Colombian Constitutional Court issued a 
landmark, but highly unusual, decision denying President Alvaro Uribe the 
possibility of running for a third term.295 Uribe left power and supported his ally 
and fellow party-member Juan Manuel Santos in the 2010 election.296 With 
Uribe’s support, Santos won the election.297 However, Santos developed an 
independent party base that pursued policies contrary to Uribe’s own agenda, 
which eventually made the two men archenemies.298 Santos, for example, 
pursued peace with the FARC guerrilla movement, a policy Uribe detested, and 
eventually reimposed an absolute one-term limit on the presidency, reversing 
changes carried out by Uribe.299  
Similarly, in Ecuador, President Correa agreed to leave power in 2017 and 
backed his close ally Lenin Moreno in the subsequent election. 300 Like Santos, 
Moreno won a close election. After developing his own power base, Moreno 
quickly turned against Correa.301 One of Moreno’s first acts was to hold a 
successful referendum reimposing presidential term limits, foreclosing Correa’s 
planned return to power.302 
The independent political space we explain here will not always emerge. 
Sometimes, a former president will seek to continue to exert significant ongoing 
influence over the direction of a party, and independent bases of power will not 
always develop. They may indeed succeed in placing a puppet or shadow-
president in office, a point we explore in more detail below.  
Where presidents have a long-term chance to be re-elected, they also have 
an incentive to undermine the rise of credible alternative leaders and influence 
the party in a direction of non-independence. Tarnishing the standing of 
alternative party leaders, however, carries clear dangers for former presidents. 
For example, the party of former presidents may lose control of the presidency, 
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and thus, the ability to influence a range of other important appointments, 
including that of prosecutors and judges who may influence a subsequent 
prosecution against former presidents.303 
Second, a delay helps counter the effect of certain behavioral biases among 
voters that tend to encourage a preference for the political status quo. A 
consecutive term limit gives voters an opportunity to reassess the reasons behind 
their support for the incumbent without the cloud of incumbency. Voters will 
then be in a better position to assess whether their support in fact reflects genuine 
political preferences for the incumbent or instead, common behavioral biases. 
Behavioral economics and social psychologists have shown that people are 
sometimes subject to forms of “endowment effect,” meaning they tend to place 
greater emphasis on certain kinds of losses over equivalent gains.304 The 
“endowment effect” can also create a persistent form of “status quo” bias in 
individual and collective decision-making.305 In a democratic context, a “status 
quo” bias results in voters preferring political incumbents simply because they 
fear losing whatever prosperity and security they currently enjoy.306 
Similarly, people often put different values on their “decision utility” 
versus “experience utility,” or have different reactions to imagining things and 
living them.307 When a strong person tells people, “I am essential to your 
wellbeing,” it is hard for voters to imagine what it would look like to live under 
a different regime. While they may ultimately find that it is not only possible to 
live with different leadership, and sometimes fare better under it, imagining this 
alternate reality can be extremely difficult. 
From this perspective, consecutive term limits may tend to disrupt biases 
of this kind. By mandating a transfer of power to a new president, term limits 
help counter the effect of endowment effects among voters. By giving voters the 
opportunity to experience a new leader, consecutive term limits may also help 
reduce the gap between decision and experience utility. 
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The evidence on presidential reelection rates lends considerable weight to 
the power of these dynamics. In Latin America, for example, Corrales and 
Penfold found that between 1998 and 2006, the general reelection rate for sitting 
presidents was between 83% and 90%, a massive incumbency advantage.308 For 
former presidents, however, the reelection rate dropped considerably to 40%.309 
This was comparable to the election rate of other major party candidates, so that 
the authors found “no detectable advantage for ex-presidents running for 
nonconsecutive reelection.”310  
For example, in Ecuador, Correa left office as a highly popular president.311 
Nonetheless, only eight months after he left office, his preferred position was 
trounced in Moreno’s successful referendum to reinstate presidential term limits. 
The result of this referendum has seemingly blocked Correa from making a 
return to power.312 This example suggests the ways in which distance from 
incumbents can erode the formidable advantages they enjoy while still in office.  
C. DESIGNING CONSECUTIVE TERM LIMITS: ONE TERM OR TWO 
As noted above in Table 1, there is important variation in the design of 
consecutive term limits around the world. About half the systems that include 
this design make presidents leave office at least temporarily after serving only 
one term in office, and the other systems require a break after two consecutive 
terms. There appears to be a near-consensus that allowing more than two 
consecutive terms in office is a bad idea, and only one system in the world with 
presidential term limits does so.  
The choice between one or two consecutive terms raises a basic tradeoff. 
Allowing only one consecutive term in office may help to reduce the risk that a 
single president will consolidate enough power to become a threat to democracy 
and be able to successfully evade term limits. A constant rotation in office 
prevents the construction of overly strong power bases, even where presidents 
return to power later, and will instead allow space for competing power centers.  
On the other hand, allowing presidents to serve no more than two 
consecutive terms in office has well-known advantages, as suggested above in 
Part I.313 A consecutive two-term limit recognizes the significance of executive 
experience, provides longer time-frames for policy-making and development, 
and gives voters the opportunity to hold a president immediately accountable for 
his or her policy promises.314 In short, presidents who serve two consecutive 
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terms are more likely to fulfill their policy promises and are more subject to 
democratic accountability. 
Whether a one or two consecutive term limit will be the better choice 
depends on a number of other elements of a country’s constitutional design. The 
most obvious one is the length of presidential terms, which globally appear to 
vary between four and seven years.315 The impact of forcing a president to stand 
down after four years is quite different from forcing them to stand down after 
six. Thus, while a system allowing two consecutive six-year terms is ill-advised, 
it may be a good idea to allow consecutive terms if the presidential terms are 
only four years, as in Brazil and Argentina.316  
Furthermore, the relative length of terms is an important aspect of design. 
The threat posed by longer stays in office may be lessened if the terms of other 
key officials, like justices, are longer and more insulated from presidential 
control.317 Thus, it may be reasonable to allow two consecutive terms in office 
where presidents have limited powers to appoint or influence officials that are 
intended to check their actions. 
 A final key feature of consecutive term limits design is how long 
presidents must sit out for before returning to office. While most systems impose 
only a one-term break, some, such as Panama, require a longer break of two 
terms.318 Constitutional designers may be more comfortable allowing presidents 
to serve two consecutive terms in office if presidents must then sit out longer 
because this helps avoid the consolidation of power and ameliorates the 
possibility of ex-presidents continuing to run the show through the installation 
of “shadow presidencies,” an issue we explore next. 
VI.  AVOIDING THE PROBLEM OF SHADOW PRESIDENTS  
A temporary or consecutive ban on reelection will be substantively 
meaningless if a president continues to exercise substantial control over the 
executive branch as a “shadow” president. In Federalist 72, Alexander Hamilton 
famously relied on this point as an argument against presidential term limits.319 
He highlighted the dangers to political stability of “half a dozen men who had 
had credit enough to be raised to the seat of the supreme magistracy, wandering 
among the people like discontented ghosts, and sighing for a place which they 
were destined never to possess[.]”320  
Recent decades have witnessed the rise of “shadow presidents” in a range 
of democratic contexts.321 In some cases, this trend has been unrelated to the 
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existence of presidential term limits and instead stems from other features of 
constitutional design. In Myanmar, for instance, limitations on the capacity of 
the president to have family members who are citizens of other countries meant 
that the National League for Democracy (NLD) leader and Nobel Prize Winner 
Aung San Suu Kyi assumed the role of “state counsellor,” which is effectively a 
form of shadow presidency.322  
Other cases, however, have been linked to an attempt to avoid the 
substantive effect of a presidential term limit. The leading example in recent 
years was the transfer of the presidency from President Vladimir Putin to 
President Dmitry Medvedev in 2008 in Russia, as a response to Putin facing 
constitutional term limits.323 Putin, in turn, moved from the presidency to the 
post of prime minister.324 While Medvedev took a somewhat different approach 
to some issues, most observers believe he remained strongly under the influence 
of Putin.325 Moreover, the independent support that Medvedev seemed to build 
from economic liberals and foreign governments during his tenure was 
ultimately insufficient to persuade or allow him to seek a second term as 
president.326 Instead, he stepped aside to allow Putin to run again as soon as he 
was constitutionally eligible to do so.327 Not surprisingly, Putin won reelection 
by a large margin both in 2012 and 2018.328 Even with constitutional term limits 
in place, Putin served four terms in office with a one-term break that did little to 
limit his power.329 
Recent work by Versteeg et al. found that the installation of a puppet ruler 
is a fairly common method for incumbents to evade term limits.330 Out of sixty 
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evasion attempts since 2000, six such attempts, which they call “placeholder 
presidents,” involved using puppet rulers as the primary method of evasion.331  
Perhaps significantly, the “puppet ruler” method has the lowest success rate 
as only two of the six attempts succeeded.332 This highlights the difficulty of 
finding a faithful agent who will be successful in the next election without the 
incumbent’s reputation and who will remain faithful to the incumbent’s 
interests, rather than developing his or her own power base. Overall, an effective 
constitutional design should prevent the implementation of shadow presidents 
that undermine the value of consecutive term limits. 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND SHADOW RULE 
Shadow presidencies are more likely to occur where the incumbent can 
continue to hold a formal post from which they can exercise power. In Russia, 
for example, President Putin managed to retain prominence in part because of 
his continued post as prime minister between 2008 and 2012.333 One of the 
potential disadvantages of semi-presidential, as opposed to pure presidential, 
systems, in this context, is that it creates two competing executive positions that 
often results in an ambiguous and shifting distribution of powers, such that 
officials like Putin and Medvedev can play a game of musical chairs with one 
another.  
More broadly, the threat of shadow presidencies can be ameliorated by 
imposing a temporary formal ban on the ability of former presidents to hold a 
range of other elected and appointed offices.334 Some appointed roles, such as a 
foreign ambassador, may raise only a limited risk of shadow influence, and be 
broadly compatible with the development of a strong party and alternative leader 
domestically.  
Alternatively, powerful presidents who leave office due to term limits may 
attempt to maintain their power by assuming the role of president or chair of 
their own party. Shadow political influence of this kind will be a direct threat to 
the development of a true alternative leadership structure within the party.335 
Thus, constitutional designers may consider extending constitutional 
prohibitions on alternative office-holding by former presidents to formal roles 
within their own political parties. While the internal organization of political 
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parties has traditionally been left to ordinary democratic politics, constitutional 
design and doctrine has increasingly moved towards a preference for direct 
regulation in the constitutional text.336  
Limiting the effectiveness of shadow rule may require limits on the ability 
of family members of an incumbent president to run for high office. Some 
constitutions prohibit a sitting president’s “blood relatives” from seeking high 
office. Panama, explored above, is one example.337  
For our purposes, the benefit of a rule preventing family members from 
running for office as an incumbent is leaving power is obvious. Family members 
of existing presidents have historically been an important route through which 
ex-presidents continue to rule behind the scenes and prevent the emergence of 
new political power bases.338 Family members are more likely to be loyal to an 
ex-president than even close, but unrelated, political allies.339  
In Senegal, at the same time he was seeking to extend presidential term 
limits, President Wade was widely believed to be grooming his son, Karim, to 
succeed him as president.340 Many observers believed that Wade’s decision to 
introduce the role of vice president was designed to achieve this form of dynastic 
political control.341  
Similarly, in Tajikistan, the constitutional changes that allowed President 
Emomali Rahmon to stay in office indefinitely also lowered the minimum age 
of presidential candidates from thirty-five to thirty. This was viewed as a bid to 
allow his 28-year-old son, Rustam, to succeed him as president.342  
In Panama, many observers suggested that Martinelli’s support for Arias, 
on a ticket with Martinelli’s spouse, Linares, as vice president, represented an 
attempt to maintain an ongoing form of “shadow” influence over the presidency. 
Fifty-six percent of voters in Panama agreed with the statement that the 
nomination of Linares represented a disguised reelection attempt by 
Martinelli.343 Many experts raised similar concerns.344  
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In Argentina, there have been several instances of presidents seeking to 
prolong their rule via the selection of a spouse. In 1951, Eva Perón considered 
running as vice president in an attempt to assume the presidency if her husband, 
President Perón, died in office.345 Eva ultimately withdrew from the race due to 
ill health.346 Peron’s third wife, Isabel Martinez de Perón, however, was able to 
serve as vice president from 1973 to 1974, and became president upon Peron’s 
death in 1974.347 More recently, the transfer of power between Nestor Kirchner 
and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner allowed the Kirchners to control the 
presidency for a twelve-year period.348  
Some family members may have an independent political base, but most 
will be reliant on the outgoing president for political support. This can make 
them susceptible to ongoing influence by the outgoing president.  
In Argentina, for example, even with her prior record as a successful 
senator, many commentators believed that President Cristina Fernandez de 
Kirchner would have stepped down to allow her husband, Nestor Kirchner to 
seek a further term as president.349 While Nestor Kirchner chose to step down 
after only one term to allow Fernandez to run in his place in 2007, some analysts 
perceived that he continued to exercise substantial influence over her 
presidency.350 It was only after Kirchner died in 2010 that many commentators 
believed she began to exercise power fully in her own right.351  
Thus, effective term limits may require temporary limits on the ability of 
close family members of presidential incumbents to run for high office. Limits 
of this kind are problematic because they explicitly limit the freedom of political 
participation of other individuals, including family members, on grounds we 
generally think are quite suspect: family identity and marriage.  
For spouses particularly, a ban of this kind may have gender-discriminatory 
effects. As the Argentinian and U.S. experience has shown, women have 
historically been socially encouraged to prioritize the political careers of their 
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spouse, even when they also have political ambitions.352 Preventing them from 
running for president, or at least doing so for a significant period, is thus likely 
to have a disparate impact based on gender. On the flip side, as we have noted,353 
power transitions between family members are most likely to raise successful 
threats of shadow presidencies. 
While there is a strong, but contestable, case for temporary bans on family 
members and spouses, we would be reluctant to sweep beyond these well-
defined categories to include non-relatives such as the “associates” of an 
outgoing president. Limits on the electoral eligibility of political associates are 
more difficult to define with precision than limits on family members. Bans that 
focus only on close formal advisors, or members of a president’s staff, may be 
readily overcome by a president selecting a successor from among their informal 
network of supporters and associates. Conversely, if bans of this kind are drawn 
too broadly, they may unjustifiably limit rights to freedom of political 
participation and association. More importantly, such bans undermine a 
president’s ability to find a successor from within his or her party, and therefore 
weaken his or her incentive to leave office at the constitutionally appointed time. 
 The dangers of shadow rule are also likely to be reduced for associates, as 
compared to family members. Non-familial associates have a stronger chance of 
developing the kind of independent political reputation and support base over 
time that is needed to resist attempts at ongoing influence by a former president. 
Recent history includes a number of examples of trusted or handpicked allies 
that later turned against their former mentors: consider Correa and Moreno in 
Ecuador, or Uribe and Santos in Colombia.354 We thus would not recommend 
extending electoral bars beyond immediate family members of an incumbent 
president. 
B. CREATING INCENTIVES TO AVOID PARTISAN BEHAVIOR 
Constitutional term limits will work best when they are combined with 
other rules that incentivize presidents to leave office and remain outside partisan 
politics for the relevant period of non-eligibility for reelection. Some of the most 
successful instances of presidential term limit “enforcement” have occurred in 
contexts where key players seem to have been mindful of these concerns. As a 
reward for staying out of partisan politics and allowing a true democratic 
alternative to emerge, former presidents have been appointed prestigious roles 
with the UN and the African Union.355  
Thus, it could be beneficial to build on this experience and create more 
formal, global roles for former presidents, as opposed to roles limited to only 
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national governance. Scholars such as Maltz, for example, suggest that 
presidential term limits could be strengthened by building on the U.S. experience 
and providing former presidents with a range of benefits, such as generous 
retirement benefits, assistance in setting up a presidential library or personal 
foundation, a role in official state ceremonies, and access to state benefits like 
bodyguards, cars, and airport transport.356 
Arrangements of this kind, as Maltz, Southall, Simutanyi, and Daniel note, 
are likely to work best if they are conditioned on a president having a track 
record of respect for democratic constitutional norms while in office.357 
Otherwise, the entities that offer these arrangements would lose credibility and 
undermine their capability to motivate potential future members to relinquish 
domestic political benefits. 
But at the same time, too strict an insistence on a perfect human rights and 
democratic record from former leaders can be counterproductive. If certain 
historical wrongs permanently bar a president from being considered for 
membership in such an institution, there will be little incentive for current actors 
to adhere to democratic constitutional norms. 
An even harder question, but one which cannot be avoided, is the impact 
of constitutional term limits on domestic and international systems of criminal 
accountability for a range of wrongs that presidents may commit while in office. 
Too great a weakening of these norms undermines commitments to democratic 
constitutionalism, human rights, and the rule of law. But too absolute an 
insistence on such norms can undermine domestic attempts to enforce national 
constitutional limits and discourage presidents from leaving office.358 Thus, 
there is, at least in some cases, a relationship between these norms and 
presidential incentive to evade term limits. 
How this balance should be struck is a significant issue largely beyond the 
scope of this Article. One possibility is the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, 
which takes into account a former president’s compliance with democratic 
constitutional limits. While compliance with presidential term limits should not 
shield a president from future criminal prosecution, a president’s peaceful 
transfer of power may be a relevant factor in deciding whether to ultimately 
prosecute them. 
VII.   ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS 
We have laid out the case for why systems vulnerable to term limit evasion 
might want to consider using consecutive, rather than absolute, bars on 
reelection. We have also analyzed some of the constitutional design choices 
relevant to that decision.  
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In this Part, we briefly consider three alternative solutions described in 
recent work on constitutional design: the proposal to scrap term limits 
completely, the proposal to rely on popular enforcement of term limits, and the 
proposal to require that any loosening to term limits may only be made 
prospectively so that it does not benefit the incumbent. 
A. SCRAPPING TERM LIMITS 
In response to the problem of non-compliance with presidential term limits, 
some have argued for the removal of presidential term limits altogether and that 
other forms of control should be relied upon. Smith, Crowley, and Leguizamon, 
for example, suggest that age and death from natural causes are effective limits 
on presidential terms.359  
An alternative approach could be to impose formal age limits on presidents, 
although we note that these kinds of provisions can create similar pressures for 
evasion as term limits themselves.360  Many presidents seeking a third or fourth 
term in Africa, for example, are already in their seventies and eighties. 
Cameroon’s President Paul Biya was seventy-five at the time he sought a third 
term in office and Congo-Brazzaville’s President, Sassou-Nguesso, was 
seventy-one when he sought another term.361 In the Congo, in order for President 
Sassou-Nguesso to remain in office, the Constitution was changed so that the 
two-term limit was removed, and the maximum age was extended for 
presidential candidates.362  
Furthermore, reliance on a president’s eventual mortality is an insufficient 
response because it does not take into account young, healthy presidents who 
are serving during their prime. In Africa, Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame was 
fifty-seven when the Parliament amended the Constitution to allow him to seek 
two further consecutive terms in 2015.363 Burundi’s President Nkurunziza was 
only fifty-four when voters approved the repeal of term limits that extended the 
length of presidential terms in 2018.364 Similarly, in Burkina Faso and 
Madagascar, Presidents Blaise Compaoré and Marc Ravalomanana were in their 
early sixties when they reached the end of their second terms.365  
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The same is true elsewhere. In Latin America, Rafael Correa was only fifty-
two when the Constitution was amended in 2015 to eliminate presidential term 
limits.366 Bolivia’s Evo Morales is only fifty-nine years old, has held power 
continuously since 2006, and now will be able to run for office indefinitely.367 
Turkmenistan also recently voted to remove the age limit for the presidency, 
allowing fifty-nine-year-old President Kurbanguly Berdymukhdamedov to 
continue to run for office in future elections.368 
Ginsburg, Melton, and Elkins suggest that informal norms or conventions 
may be a better alternative to formal constitutional limits.369 For example, 
George Washington famously retired from the presidency after two terms, 
thereby creating a de facto convention that a president would only serve two 
presidential terms.370 This was well before the adoption of the Twenty-Second 
Amendment.371 Some of the most notable examples of voluntary presidential 
retirement in Africa occurred in South Africa and Tanzania before or in the 
absence of formal, relevant term limits.372 In Tanzania especially, this seems to 
have contributed to an ongoing “culture” of voluntary presidential retirement.373 
President Julius Nyerere voluntarily stepped down from the presidency of 
Tanzania in 1985 after a lengthy period as president.374 Both Presidents 
Benjamin Mkapa and Jakaya Kikwete followed the same pattern and stepped 
down at the end of the two-terms permitted by the Constitution in 2005 and 
2015, respectively.375 There are encouraging signs that the current Tanzanian 
President John Magufuli will take the same approach and leave office by no later 
than 2025, rather than support calls to repeal or remove current term limits.376 
In some contexts, there are good arguments for making constitutional 
limitations informal and voluntary, rather than formal and legally mandated. 
Government officials may be more likely to comply with certain requirements 
when they are trusted to do so, instead of being constitutionally directed or 
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mandated to act a certain way. This reflects broader human tendencies to 
reciprocate expressions of trust and the relatively weak effect of constitutional 
constraints.377  
It is dangerous, however, to rely on informal norms to encourage or enforce 
constitutional term limits. The fact that presidents are facing the end of their 
term, and thus the end of an ongoing political give-and-take relationship, gives 
rise to the problem of constitutional non-compliance in the first place. Often, 
there will be exogenous factors, such as war, or other political or economic 
crises, that may encourage a president to remain in office and depart from 
informal conventions of this kind. It was arguably pressures of this kind that led 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to overlook the norm of a two-term 
presidency and stand for a third and then fourth presidential term during the 
Great Depression and World War II.378 Similar arguments about the need for 
economic and political stability have been used to justify the repeal of term 
limits in other contexts. 
Ginsburg, Melton, and Elkins have also suggested that it may be preferable 
to replace term limits with a form of “super-majoritarian” escalator, whereby 
presidents are required to gain increasing majorities the longer they are in 
office.379 However, such a proposal raises problems of incentives that could be 
even more dramatic than those posed by an absolute ban on reelection. 
Presidents who win a majority of the popular vote may have weak incentives to 
accept the results of an election that they fail to win with a sufficient 
supermajority.380 Provisions of this kind therefore raise the risk of presidents 
engaging in forms of constitutional over-staying that are even more dangerous 
to democracy than the circumvention of term limits. 
B. POPULAR ENFORCEMENT OF TERM LIMITS 
In recent work, we argue that enforcement of “tiered” systems of 
constitutional change, such as eternity clauses that protect provisions like term 
limits may be more likely to occur through popular means, rather than resorting 
to the courts.381 Versteeg et al. take this position forcefully, noting that there has 
only been one successful example since 2000 of a court blocking an attempt to 
change a constitutional term limit.382 In 2010, the court successfully blocked 
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President Uribe’s attempt to amend his presidential term limit.383 The 
Colombian case, however, relied on specific conditions that may not commonly 
be present at moments of stress where incumbents seek to eliminate term limits. 
First, in that case, the court retained independence and power and had not been 
packed or otherwise placed under the thumb of the president.384 Second, Uribe’s 
congressional coalition was quite fragmented and many of his rivals within his 
movement welcomed the decision because it created a new opportunity for 
them.385 
It is common for courts to support incumbents seeking to stay in office 
beyond their constitutionally appointed term by removing term limits.386 Indeed, 
as we noted above, the courts are a fairly common instrument used by 
incumbents to stay in power.387  
In contrast, there have been failed attempts to change presidential term 
limits because of popular protests. In Paraguay, as noted above, an attempt to 
extend term limits in a clearly unconstitutional manner was scrapped because of 
massive protests backed by the Catholic Church and a broad swath of civil 
society.388 In Ecuador, similarly, in the face of huge protests, Correa assented to 
the crucial provision requiring that he stand down in 2017.389 Similar dynamics 
have worked in Africa, for example in Burkina Faso in 2014 and Malawi in 
2002.390  
As a descriptive matter, there is evidence that popular involvement is often 
critical to halting attempts to evade or to change presidential term limits.391 The 
trouble is determining how to leverage popular involvement into principles of 
constitutional design. Most of the factors that determine levels of popular 
uprising are extrinsic to constitutional design. In our earlier paper, we have ideas 
for how designers might make popular mobilization around constitutional 
protections for term limits especially likely.392  
One solution is to design term limit provisions such that any ambiguity is 
removed. Provisions that unequivocally identify the term limit by name and that 
clearly require a stringent, heightened procedure to change the term limit can 
better counteract the weaknesses of vague constitutional designs.393 The latter 
kind of design is really a delegation to courts through legalistic language, and as 
noted, courts are not to be trusted during these situations. 
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A second possibility is to require popular referenda to change term limits. 
There are recent examples of popular presidents losing referenda to extend or 
eliminate term limits, including President Chavez of Venezuela in 2007 
(although Chavez later succeeded in 2009), and President Morales of Bolivia in 
2015 (although Morales later convinced a court to remove the limit).394 
Presidents Chavez and Morales were popular but their proposals were less so. 
However, referenda are famously malleable instruments in regimes where 
democracy is absent or threatened.395 There are plenty of other cases where 
referenda to eradicate term limits passed overwhelmingly. At any rate, voting in 
a popular referendum does not have the same effect as the sorts of popular 
protests that have successfully prevented a president’s attempt to evade term 
limits. 
The bottom line is that we have some distance to go in identifying how 
constitutional design can support popular mobilization in these kinds of 
moments. It is likely that constitutional design can only do so much. Proposals 
to encourage popular mobilization, however, are fully concordant with our own 
design proposal in this Article. 
C. PROSPECTIVE-ONLY RULES OF CHANGE 
A final alternative solution focuses squarely on constitutional design. One 
possibility is for constitutions to include a rule allowing changes to term limits, 
but also stating that any changes will only take effect after the incumbent has 
left office. Consider, for example, the constitution of South Korea, which states 
that “[a]mendments to the Constitution for the extension of the term of office of 
the President or for a change allowing for the reelection of the President shall 
not be effective for the President in office at the time of the proposal for such 
amendments to the Constitution.”396 
 This provision states in clear language that any change to the presidential 
term length or limit will not benefit the president who is the incumbent at the 
time the change is made.397 Other constitutions may achieve a similar effect 
through the use of temporal restrictions on amendments. Where constitutional 
changes to term limits take a long time to carry out or require sequential votes 
with intervening elections, they may also make it unlikely or impossible for the 
current president to benefit from the change.398 
There is a certain appeal to these kinds of rules. They ensure that changes 
to term limits occur because of their long-term benefits and costs, and not as a 
way to help a current president remain in office. They seek to ensure, in other 
words, that constitutional changes to term limits occur behind something of a 
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veil of ignorance, such that the beneficiary of the change remains ambiguous or 
unknown. These kinds of constitutional provisions may be very useful 
throughout constitutional law and remain understudied. The inclusion of a 
prospective-only rule for constitutional change is also complementary to our 
own proposal. A bar against consecutive terms can be bolstered if placed on a 
higher tier with a prospective-only rule for change. 
However, we are skeptical that a provision like the South Korean one, 
standing alone, will prove to be a robust barrier against term limit abuse. While 
it creates an obstacle for presidents seeking to remain in power, it does little to 
ameliorate the powerful incentives that presidents often have to evade term 
limits. As a result, presidents may turn to substitutes for formal amendments to 
achieve their goals. For example, presidents could turn to the courts, which could 
reinterpret the provision or remove it. There are arguments, grounded in 
principles of equality or on the will of voters, that would potentially allow courts 
to do so.399  
Relatedly, we note that prospective application of term limits is also a 
double-edged sword that has often been abused by incumbents. Would-be 
authoritarian leaders in several countries have allowed new term limits to go into 
effect, but have then either included explicit provisions stating that the new 
limits apply only prospectively, or convinced courts to adopt similar 
interpretations.  
In Angola, Equatorial Guinea, and Zimbabwe, for example, term limits 
were only added to the constitution on a prospective basis in 2010, 2011, and 
2013, when Presidents Dos Santo, Mugabe, and Obiang Nguema had all been in 
power for more than two decades.400 In Sudan, a term limit was introduced in 
2005, but was not implemented until 2010. This allows President al-Bashir, who 
has been in power since 1993, to potentially remain in power until 2020.401  
In Burkina Faso, President Compaoré, who has been in power since 1983, 
succeeded in removing constitutional term limits in 1997.402 He agreed to re-
introduce them in 2000 but again, only on a prospective basis so he could remain 
in office until at least 2015.403 In Rwanda, the term limit changes introduced in 
2015 allowed President Kagame to serve an initial “transitional” seven-year term 
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beginning in 2017, followed by two further five-year terms,404 thereby 
potentially allowing him to stay in office for a total of thirty-one years.405  
Constitutional courts have sometimes adopted a similar interpretation of 
term limits at the behest of incumbents. In Bolivia, for example, well before 
Morales sought to loosen term limits, the Bolivian Constitutional Court held that 
the two-term limit in the new 2009 Constitution did not apply to Morales’s 
term.406 Effectively, this allowed Morales to serve three consecutive terms in 
office, rather than two terms, before even seeking to change the limit. Similarly, 
in Burundi, the 2015 decision of the Constitutional Court on term limits 
effectively postponed their effect so they only became binding after an 
additional five years in office.407 
The pervasiveness of these abuses of prospective application of term limits 
may reduce our confidence in their viability in constitutional design. Ideally, 
there would be a norm mandating that loosening of a presidential term limit must 
be prospective such that any tightening of the term limit could be applied to 
incumbents. At the moment, however, no such norm exists. 
CONCLUSION  
Timing is one of the key mechanisms available to constitutional designers 
in entrenching democracy. We have noted elsewhere that “tiered” systems of 
constitutional change that make certain kinds of change more costly work 
largely by raising the political costs, or level of political support, needed for anti-
democratic constitutional change.408 This has the effect of both deterring and 
delaying such change. Delay can also be built into constitutional design in a 
more explicit sense; double passage requirements and similar devices may slow 
the actions of would-be authoritarians, and this may create space for them to lose 
power before they can consolidate control.  
Delay, by itself, does not guarantee that democracy will survive. It may 
simply slow an inevitable process of democratic backsliding. However, delay 
can help create a window for broader social or political change, which can 
undermine democratic support for would-be authoritarian actors or policies.  
A similar logic applies to temporary presidential term limits. Relatively 
“weak” bans on consecutive reelection are more likely to be effective than 
absolute bans on all reelection because they deal with the constitutional end-
game problem we have identified. They give incumbents hope of a potential 
return to power later, which may make those incumbents less likely to seek 
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extraordinary measures to alter a term limit through either formal or informal 
means.  
At the same time, such bans protect democracy because they remove 
presidents from power at least for a set period of time. This delay, in turn, helps 
reduce the actual chances a president will be elected to a third or fourth term by 
creating space for opposition figures and independent voices within the 
president’s own party. The experience of presidential alternation in Tanzania, 
for example, has not been one of alternation between parties, as all three 
presidents that have stepped down at the expiration of their term were from the 
same political party.409 However, the experience nonetheless helped build a 
stronger ruling party, as well as democratic traditions and norms.410 
Furthermore, even if a president is eventually reelected to a non-consecutive 
term, they will likely pose less of a threat to democracy than if they had held 
power continuously because the time they spend out of office reduces their 
ability to accumulate formal and informal forms of control. 
In this light, the U.S. presidential term limit is emblematic only in certain 
respects and poorly designed in others. While it lacks the special form of 
entrenchment or tiered constitutional design found in many modern orders, the 
term limit is nonetheless highly entrenched because Article V itself makes all 
formal constitutional change of the U.S. Constitution extremely difficult.411 We 
agree with others who have argued that the formal amendment of the U.S. term 
limit provision for the benefit of a would-be authoritarian president is 
unlikely.412 In most political conditions, political minorities would maintain 
sufficient power at the congressional or state-legislative level to block the 
proposal.413 Even in the worst case, the legislature would likely slow the 
proposal, since the United States’ process is time-consuming.414  
However, this design may actually exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, the 
end game problem identified in this article. Would-be authoritarian presidents 
cannot formally amend the term limit but will still seek to stay in power. Thus, 
they have very strong incentives to seek other means of change, such as 
manipulation of the judiciary or wholesale replacement of the constitution. Thus, 
the design of term limits in the U.S. Constitution may inadvertently raise risks 
of authoritarianism. Perhaps most important, this feature makes the U.S. design 
a perilous model for countries abroad. In many contexts, we have argued, a 
weaker, consecutive ban on holding power for more than two terms may make 
more sense than an absolute bar to reelection. 
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